Source: http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/06-1195.pdf
Official - Subject to Final Review 1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 2 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x 3 LAKHDAR BOUMEDIENE, ET : 4 AL. : 5 Petitioners : 6 v. : No. 06-1195 7 GEORGE W. BUSH, PRESIDENT : 8 OF THE UNITED STATES, ET : 9 AL.; : 10 and : 11 KHALED A. F. AL ODAH, NEXT : 12 FRIEND OF FAWZI KHALID : 13 ABDULLAH FAHAD AL ODAH, : 14 ET AL., : 15 Petitioners : 16 v. : No. 06-1196 17 UNITED STATES, ET AL. : 18 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x 19 Washington, D.C. 20 Wednesday, December 5, 2007 21 22 The above-entitled matter came on for oral 23 argument before the Supreme Court of the United States 24 at 10:01 a.m. 25 1 Alderson Reporting Company Official - Subject to Final Review 1 APPEARANCES: 2 SETH P. WAXMAN, ESQ., Washington, D.C.; on behalf of 3 the Petitioners. 4 GEN. PAUL D. CLEMENT, ESQ., Solicitor General, 5 Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; on behalf of 6 the Respondents. 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 2 Alderson Reporting Company Official - Subject to Final Review 1 C O N T E N T S 2 ORAL ARGUMENT OF PAGE 3 SETH P. WAXMAN, ESQ. 4 On behalf of the Petitioners 4 5 GEN. PAUL D. CLEMENT, ESQ. 6 On behalf of the Respondents 32 7 REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF 8 SETH P. WAXMAN, ESQ. 9 On behalf of the Petitioners 72 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 3 Alderson Reporting Company Official - Subject to Final Review 1 P R O C E E D I N G S 2 (10:01 a.m.) 3 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: We'll hear argument 4 this morning in case 06-1195, Boumediene v. Bush, and 5 case 06-1196, Al Odah v. United States. 6 Mr. Waxman. 7 ORAL ARGUMENT OF SETH W. WAXMAN 8 ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS 9 MR. WAXMAN: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it 10 please the Court: 11 The Petitioners in these cases have three 12 things in common. First, all have been confined at 13 Guantanamo for almost six years, yet not one has ever 14 had meaningful notice of the factual grounds of 15 detention or a fair opportunity to dispute those grounds 16 before a neutral decision-maker. 17 Two, under the decision below, they have no 18 prospect of getting that opportunity. 19 And three, each maintains, as this Court 20 explained in Rasul, that he is quote "innocent of all 21 wrongdoing." Now the government contends that these men 22 are detainable, and the facts of these 37 cases differ, 23 and it may well that be that an adjudicatory process 24 that preserves the core features of common law habeas 25 would reveal perhaps that some of these Petitioners are 4 Alderson Reporting Company Official - Subject to Final Review 1 lawfully detainable. But limited DTA review of the 2 structurally flawed CSRT process cannot provide any 3 reliable examination of the Executive's asserted basis 4 for detaining these Petitioners, let alone an adequate 5 substitute for traditional habeas review. 6 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I thought that we 7 ruled in the Hamdi case that procedures quite similar to 8 those under the DTA were adequate for American citizens? 9 MR. WAXMAN: Well, with respect, Mr. Chief 10 Justice, what you ruled -- as I understand what the 11 plurality held in Hamdi was that so long as there was a 12 process accompanying detention, that provided for 13 meaningful notice of the factual grounds for detention, 14 a meaningful opportunity to present evidence in response 15 to that before a neutral tribunal with the assistance of 16 counsel, that determination would certainly be entitled 17 to substantial deference by a habeas court; and we don't 18 dispute that. 19 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So that -- 20 MR. WAXMAN: That's not what they got. 21 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So our judgment in 22 this case depends upon whether we agree with you or the 23 government that the procedures available under the DTA 24 are meaningful under Hamdi? 25 MR. WAXMAN: It -- I think your decision in 5 Alderson Reporting Company Official - Subject to Final Review 1 this case, the question -- the principal question we 2 think is presented by the case is whether or not the DTA 3 review of the CSRT procedures that occurred in this case 4 adequately substitute for the writ of habeas corpus. 5 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Mr. Waxman, how could 6 that be, because the D.C. Circuit never got to that 7 question? The D.C. Circuit, as I understand it, ruled 8 that there was no access to habeas, end of case. 9 So the D.C. Circuit never examined the 10 procedure under the DTA, did it? 11 MR. WAXMAN: No. The district court -- the 12 two district judges sitting in habeas went to the merits 13 of the case, and Judge Green did evaluate the 14 procedures. The D.C. Circuit held that the 15 Constitution, neither the Suspension Clause nor the Due 16 Process Clause, applies to these people. And therefore 17 it didn't reach the merits. But -- 18 JUSTICE GINSBURG: So shouldn't we, if we 19 agree with you, that there is authority in the 20 D.C. Circuit, send it back to them to make that 21 determination whether habeas being required, this is an 22 adequate substitute. 23 MR. WAXMAN: Well, I'm not saying that this 24 Court couldn't do that. It certainly could do that. 25 But one of the principal -- the principal guarantee of 6 Alderson Reporting Company Official - Subject to Final Review 1 habeas corpus through the centuries has been a speedy -- 2 the remedy of speedy release for somebody who is 3 unlawfully being held in executive detention. 4 These 37 men have been held in isolation for 5 6 years, and it is manifest on the record in this case. 6 There's no doubt about how the CSRT has proceeded. 7 There is little doubt about the circumscribed nature of 8 the D.C. Circuit's review. The D.C. Circuit has already 9 held that the Constitution doesn't apply. 10 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Your argument 11 wouldn't be any different with respect to the 12 availability of habeas if these people were held for one 13 day, would it? We don't look at the length of detention 14 in deciding whether habeas is available, do we? 15 MR. WAXMAN: Well, I want to give a 16 qualified disagreement with your hypothetical, because 17 it's entirely clear that, as I think members of this 18 Court have indicated and that habeas traditionally 19 indicates, there may be military exigencies, there may 20 be a limited time period in which it is inappropriate 21 for a habeas court to rule. And moreover -- if there -- 22 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, let me just 23 stop you there. Do you want this Court to rule on 24 whether or not there are military exigencies that 25 require the holding and detention of these enemy 7 Alderson Reporting Company Official - Subject to Final Review 1 combatants? 2 MR. WAXMAN: No, what I was referring to 3 were sort of the hypothetical of battlefield -- somebody 4 is captured -- you know -- and the next day or the next 5 week from the battlefield, does he or she have the right 6 to -- does a habeas court have constitutional 7 jurisdiction. Putting aside- 8 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Putting aside the 9 battlefield hypothetical, we're talking about 10 Guantanamo. Your argument is that somebody held one day 11 in Guantanamo has the right to habeas. So the extent of 12 detention is irrelevant to your assertion. 13 MR. WAXMAN: I don't think so, with respect. 14 I think -- I don't think -- I think it is appropriate 15 for a habeas -- if the Executive says we have detained 16 this person, we believe this person is an enemy 17 combatant who may be lawfully detained under the AUMF, 18 we have an administrative process that is fair, that 19 will -- that will determine the facts. You should stay 20 your hand to allow that procedure to occur. Of course, 21 that is appropriate, so long as the procedure is 22 meaningful and speedy. That's what we do in immigration 23 cases. 24 JUSTICE GINSBURG: But your basic position 25 has to rest on Guantanamo Bay being just like if we had 8 Alderson Reporting Company Official - Subject to Final Review 1 the detainees in, say, the Everglades. But do you 2 concede that if these people had never been brought to 3 the United States, if the facility were in, say, 4 Germany, that these detainees would have no access to 5 habeas, no access to our courts? 6 MR. WAXMAN: I wouldn't agree with that for 7 two reasons. First of all, I think these people are in 8 a place that is even -- that is under even more complete 9 control and jurisdiction of our national Executive than 10 they would be in the Everglades, because there are no 11 Federalism constraints here. Our national government 12 supplies the only law. 13 And if they were detained in Germany, the 14 question would be A, are they being detained by the 15 United States or by some multinational coalition force 16 as was the case, for example, in Hirota. 17 B, are there other laws, or can they invoke 18 the jurisdiction of another court? And the answer to 19 that question would depend upon the terms of our -- 20 JUSTICE SCALIA: Who says that -- let's 21 consider first the basis on which the court of appeals 22 decided this case. 23 They decided it -- in Rasul, we had held 24 that the habeas statute extended to Guantanamo, and that 25 those people who had filed their suits before the 9 Alderson Reporting Company Official - Subject to Final Review 1 statute, at least, could bring a suit. 2 Congress acted. And enacted a new habeas 3 statute which makes it very clear that the habeas 4 statute, at least, does not apply to these people in 5 Guantanamo. 6 Your assertion here is that there is a 7 common law constitutional right of habeas corpus that 8 does not depend upon any statute. 9 Do you have a single case in the 220 years 10 of our country or, for that matter, in the five 11 centuries of the English empire in which habeas was 12 granted to an alien in a territory that was not under 13 the sovereign control of either the United States or 14 England. 15 MR. WAXMAN: The answer to that is a 16 resounding yes. 17 JUSTICE SCALIA: What is -- what are they? 18 MR. WAXMAN: They are the cases that were 19 discussed and cited by the majority opinion in Rasul, 20 and we have -- we have added other ones to them, but 21 it's showing -- 22 JUSTICE SCALIA: What cases -- what case in 23 particular do you think in Rasul? 24 MR. WAXMAN: I think the opinion of two of 25 the three law lords in the Earl of Crewe, which the 10 Alderson Reporting Company Official - Subject to Final Review 1 majority cited as In re Sekgome. It is certain -- the 2 government concedes it was the case in Mwenya. It was 3 true in the Indian cases. And, in fact, as we point out 4 -- 5 JUSTICE SCALIA: Mwenya involved an English 6 -- an English subject, not an alien. 7 MR. WAXMAN: Indeed, it did. 8 JUSTICE SCALIA: The question there is an 9 alien. 10 MR. WAXMAN: Indeed, it did, and the 11 government -- 12 JUSTICE SCALIA: So it's totally irrelevant. 13 MR. WAXMAN: Well, no -- let me take a shot 14 at convincing you that it's not totally irrelevant. The 15 Crown Counsel in that case, in his brief, stated 16 forthrightly that subjecthood or citizenship didn't 17 matter and, in fact, in the very minority opinion that 18 the government relies on in its brief here in Earl of 19 Crewe, Lord Justice Kennedy specifically said that the 20 citizenship is irrelevant. It isn't and wasn't -- 21 JUSTICE SCALIA: In both of those cases, it 22 was a citizen, nonetheless. In 220 years of our 23 history, or five centuries of the -- do you have a 24 single case in which it was not a citizen of England or 25 a citizen of the United States in which a common-law 11 Alderson Reporting Company Official - Subject to Final Review 1 writ of habeas corpus issued to a piece of land that was 2 not within the sovereign jurisdiction? 3 MR. WAXMAN: Well, the Court majority in 4 Rasul cites a case involving the Isle of Jersey, the 5 Channel Islands. None of those were within the 6 sovereign courts' -- 7 JUSTICE SCALIA: They were not regarded as 8 part of the crown's dominion, but they were part of the 9 crown's sovereign territory. 10 MR. WAXMAN: I'll take one more chance, 11 Justice Scalia. 12 JUSTICE SCALIA: Okay, try them. I mean, 13 line them up. 14 (Laughter.) 15 MR. WAXMAN: Okay. Here they go. In the 16 Indian cases -- I mean, first of all, let's say that 17 citizenship was not a notion at common law. The 18 question was subjecthood, and subjecthood was a very 19 ill-defined term that had no fixed parameters, as our 20 reply brief points out. 21 Certainly many of the petitioners in the 22 Indian cases that we cited -- and in fact that Sir John 23 Chambers decided -- were not Englishmen or people who 24 would have been otherwise considered -- 25 JUSTICE SCALIA: And the cases were decided 12 Alderson Reporting Company Official - Subject to Final Review 1 under a statute that applied in India, not under -- 2 under the common law. 3 And the writ did not come from England; the 4 writ came from English courts in India under a statute. 5 And we decided that in Rasul. I mean, you want to do 6 that in Rasul, that's fine. But you are appealing to a 7 common law right that somehow found its way into our 8 constitution without, as far as I can discern, a single 9 case in which the writ ever to a non-citizen. 10 MR. WAXMAN: Justice Scalia, as Lord 11 Mansfield explained in the King v. Cowle, and both sides 12 are citing to it -- even if the writ -- even with 13 respect to the persons detained outside the English 14 realm, the relevant question was, is this person under 15 the subjection of the crown? Not what is the 16 subjecthood or citizenship of this person? And in fact 17 -- 18 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: What is the 19 relevance to your -- this line of reasoning to the 20 recent enactment by Congress of section 1005(g), which 21 says that the base at Guantanamo is not part of the 22 United States? There is a judgment by the political 23 branches that we don't exercise sovereignty over the 24 leasehold, and it seems to me that, if we're going to 25 adhere to our habeas corpus cases, we would have to 13 Alderson Reporting Company Official - Subject to Final Review 1 reject that determination. 2 MR. WAXMAN: Mr. Chief Justice, let me 3 answer that question directly and then if I may finish 4 my answer to Justice Scalia. 5 We don't contend that the United States 6 exercises sovereignty over Guantanamo Bay. Our 7 contention is that at common law, sovereignty (a) wasn't 8 the test, as Lord Mansfield explained, and (b) wasn't a 9 clear-cut determine -- there weren't clear-cut 10 sovereignty lines in those days. Our case doesn't 11 depend on sovereignty. It depends on the fact that, 12 among other things, the United States exercises -- 13 quote -- "complete jurisdiction and control over this 14 base." No other law applies. 15 If our law doesn't apply, it is a law-free 16 zone. 17 JUSTICE ALITO: So the answer to 18 Justice Ginsburg's question, it wouldn't matter where 19 these detainees were held so long as they are under U.S. 20 control. If they were held on a U.S. military base 21 pursuant to a standard treaty with another country, if 22 they were in Afghanistan or in Iraq, the result would be 23 the same? 24 MR. WAXMAN: No, I think, Justice Alito, I 25 want to be as clear about this as I can be. This is a 14 Alderson Reporting Company Official - Subject to Final Review 1 particularly easy straightforward case, but in another 2 place, jurisdiction would depend on the facts and 3 circumstances, including the nature of an agreement with 4 the resident sovereign over who exercises control. And 5 I want to come back to that with the Japan and German 6 example, because I have read the status of forces 7 agreements there. 8 Secondly, even if there technically were 9 jurisdiction, there might very well be justiciability 10 issues under the circumstances of the sort that 11 Justice Kennedy addressed in his concurrence in Rasul; 12 that is, there may be circumstances and temporal 13 conditions in which, under the separation of powers, it 14 would be a -- a court would deem it inappropriate to 15 exercise that jurisdiction. 16 And finally, even if it were appropriate to 17 exercise the jurisdiction, the review of a habeas court 18 in the mine run of cases would be anything but plenary 19 because members of enemy armed forces and enemy aliens 20 within the meaning of the Alien Enemy Act are 21 detainable. Period. Now, with respect to -- 22 JUSTICE ALITO: What if, in a future war, 23 many of the soldiers and the opposing Army don't wear 24 uniforms? What if it's a war like Vietnam and thousands 25 of prisoners are taken into custody and they are brought 15 Alderson Reporting Company Official - Subject to Final Review 1 to prisoner-of-war camps in the United States as 2 occurred during World War II? Every one of them under 3 your theory could file a habeas petition. Is that 4 right? 5 MR. WAXMAN: Well, if they were in the 6 United States, I think it's clear that they could file a 7 habeas petition. And, you know, the question about how 8 Guantanamo relates to that is for this Court. What's 9 material is that -- I mean we cited to the Court the 10 Army directives and the Army procedures implementing 11 Article V of the Geneva Conventions that were used in 12 Vietnam, which is the only other war we engaged in that 13 had combatants who weren't in uniforms. They not only 14 had a hearing that was near the time and near the place 15 of capture and the right to call witnesses; there's no 16 evidence that classified information was withheld from 17 them. And they not only had a right to counsel; the 18 government provided them counsel, somebody who was their 19 advocate. 20 Now, once a determination like that is made, 21 they may -- if they're detained in the United States -- 22 they may file a habeas petition and the response will be 23 there is absolutely no reason not to defer to the 24 adjudication of that tribunal. You have, as I started 25 with the Chief Justice, you had a fair notice of the 16 Alderson Reporting Company Official - Subject to Final Review 1 facts, a fair opportunity to challenge them with the 2 assistance of counsel before a neutral decisionmaker. 3 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So to determine 4 whether there's jurisdiction, in every case we have to 5 go through a multi factor analysis to determine if the 6 United States exercises not sovereignty, which you've 7 rejected as the touchstone, but sufficient control over 8 a particular military base? Over the Philippines during 9 World War II, in Vietnam, and it is going to decide in 10 some cases whether the control is sufficient and others 11 whether it isn't? 12 MR. WAXMAN: Well, I don't -- 13 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: And that is a 14 judgment we the Court would make, not the political 15 branches who have to deal with the competing 16 sovereignties in those situations? 17 MR. WAXMAN: You know, I think -- both sides 18 try to derive force from the fact that such claims, such 19 habeas petitions, haven't come forward in floods in the 20 past. 21 I think the reason is that, in the past, we 22 had combat in which -- you know -- I mean in a war of 23 the conventional sort, soldiers wear uniforms, and more 24 to the point, the interests of the captured soldier and 25 the command -- and the capturing officer are aligned. 17 Alderson Reporting Company Official - Subject to Final Review 1 The captured soldier wants to be treated as a prisoner 2 of war or released. 3 The commanding general wants to release 4 civilians who aren't in the Army or turn them over for 5 criminal prosecution. That's why, in the Gulf war, 6 there were 1200 -- roughly, just a few hundred, 1200 7 Article V field tribunal hearings that were held, of 8 which almost 900 were released as civilian 9 non-combatants and the remaining were detained -- 10 JUSTICE SCALIA: Counsel, we had 400,000 11 German prisoners in this country during World War II. 12 And not a -- you say it's clear in the Vietnam example 13 that the Chief Justice gave you, it's clear that habeas 14 would lie. 400,000 of these people. It never occurred 15 to them. 16 MR. WAXMAN: Well, first of all, there is 17 Colepaugh -- 18 JUSTICE SCALIA: And many of them were 19 civilians, by the way, and not in uniform. Not a single 20 habeas petition filed. 21 MR. WAXMAN: There's -- there are Colepaugh, 22 the Tenth Circuit case and In re: Territo, both of which 23 we discussed. But more to the point, as I said, 24 Justice Scalia, there is no doubt that a member of the 25 German army or somebody who is assisting the German 18 Alderson Reporting Company Official - Subject to Final Review 1 army -- it would be totally unavailing to file a -- to 2 file a habeas petition because they are detainable. It 3 would be like Mr. Ludekey in the United States v. 4 Ludekey saying -- 5 JUSTICE SCALIA: He claims he wasn't 6 assisting the German army, just as these people here 7 claim that they were not attacking U.S. bases. 8 MR. WAXMAN: They were provided Article V 9 tribunals that gave them actual notice of the 10 government's facts and actual opportunity to controvert 11 it and a determination by military officers who had not 12 been told that both the commanding general of the 13 southern command and the Secretary of Defense had 14 personally reviewed the evidence and determined that 15 these were enemy combatants; and a habeas court would 16 simply dismiss. 17 And a habeas court could simply say whether 18 we do or don't technically have jurisdiction under 19 battlefield circumstances or circumstances involving 20 foreign detainees in a zone of occupation where active 21 hostilities occur, it is inappropriate under the 22 separation of powers for us to intervene. But these men 23 have been held, taken by the United States, thousands of 24 miles away -- in the case of my six individuals, plucked 25 from their homes, from their wives and children in 19 Alderson Reporting Company Official - Subject to Final Review 1 Sarajevo, detained for three months at the United States 2 request. 3 JUSTICE ALITO: Your primary position is 4 that we should order that they be released, is that 5 correct? 6 MR. WAXMAN: Well, we've asked that they be 7 granted habeas relief. We think what that means is that 8 they should be -- the cases should be returned to the 9 district courts where their cases are proceeding. The 10 government has filed its factual returns to the writ. 11 Judge Green, in the cases pending before her, has 12 established procedures to protect the -- 13 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Suppose there had not been 14 a six-year wait, would it be appropriate then for us 15 to -- if you prevail -- remand the case to the habeas 16 court and instruct the habeas court to defer until the 17 Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has 18 finished the DTA review proceedings? 19 MR. WAXMAN: I would argue that the answer 20 is no for two reasons. The one because there is no 21 prospect, no prospect that the DTA proceedings will be 22 conducted with alacrity or certainty; and second of 23 all -- 24 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Why should I assume that 25 the district court in Washington would be any faster 20 Alderson Reporting Company Official - Subject to Final Review 1 than the court of appeals? 2 MR. WAXMAN: Here's -- the -- the -- let's 3 take the cases in front of Judge Green. Judge Leon in 4 the cases of my client just granted the government's 5 motion to dismiss. But in all of the cases the 6 government has filed its factual return under the 7 procedures, under the long-established habeas procedures 8 under 2243. It is -- the burden is now on us. She has 9 already ruled that with respect to secret information or 10 classified information, here are the safeguards that 11 will govern, here's how we will work. And it is simply 12 on us now to adduce and present evidence to try and 13 over -- to try to shoulder the burden we have. 14 In the court of appeals, Justice Kennedy, 15 the government, after two years, has not produced the 16 record on review in a single case. It has now said -- 17 two years. It has now said that it cannot do so, and 18 the court of appeals has suggested that what the 19 government ought to do is hold entirely new CSRT 20 proceedings. 21 Now, those proceedings are structurally 22 flawed. Perhaps this Court could say, look, here's how 23 it's going to be. First of all, the Constitution does 24 apply. Second of all, we have to have a hearing in 25 which the following things occur. 21 Alderson Reporting Company Official - Subject to Final Review 1 We either in the Court of Appeals under the 2 All Writs Act or under 28 USC Section 2347C -- the 3 Petitioners have to have the right to adduce and present 4 evidence to controvert the government's return which 5 was -- almost all of the government's evidence was 6 introduced ex parte, in camera, and with a -- to boot 7 with a presumption that it is accurate and genuine. 8 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Why can't that take place 9 in the CSRT review proceedings that are pending? 10 MR. WAXMAN: Well, I don't -- it could if 11 the military had different procedures to govern the 12 CSRTs. And our submission is that with respect to these 13 Petitioners, you've asked to hold aside the six years. 14 I would say with respect to future detainees, that this 15 Court could issue a ruling -- well, this Court should 16 issue a ruling saying for these people if the writ means 17 anything, the time for experimentation is over. We have 18 tried and true established procedures. We've got 19 experienced district judges including a judge who was 20 the chief judge in the FISA court, who's already 21 established the rules for maintaining confidentiality of 22 classified information. 23 But we are not as a Court saying that there 24 could not readily be an adequate substitute if the 25 administrative procedures generated by the Department of 22 Alderson Reporting Company Official - Subject to Final Review 1 Defense allowed for the process minimums that the Chief 2 Justice asked me about at the beginning and advocated a 3 standard that was authorized -- a substantive standard 4 authorized by the AUMF. DTA review may very well be an 5 adequate substitute. 6 JUSTICE SOUTER: Is that possible for 7 your -- let's say your six clients at this point or for 8 any of the Guantanamo detainees, I guess, because 9 wouldn't they all run into the problem of -- the 10 neutrality problem that you raised? The commanding 11 general, the Secretary of Defense, in effect, have 12 already said these people belong where they are. 13 Wouldn't that make it impossible, really, at this stage 14 of the game to substitute a military procedure? 15 MR. WAXMAN: I certainly think so. But at a 16 minimum, Justice Souter, you would have to have the kind 17 of tribunal that is called for under the uniform code of 18 military justice. 19 JUSTICE SOUTER: I understand that. 20 MR. WAXMAN: Where you don't have the 21 convening authority exercising command control over the 22 tribunal officer. 23 JUSTICE SOUTER: I'm just wondering whether 24 assuming you win this case, that would be an appropriate 25 form of relief. And I'm not sure -- 23 Alderson Reporting Company Official - Subject to Final Review 1 MR. WAXMAN: I don't think it is. I 2 certainly don't think it would be unless this Court 3 clarified under the -- I don't know whether this would 4 fall under the guise of clarification; but specify that 5 under the circumstances, the deferential review of the 6 D.C. Circuit in which it presumes accurate and presumes 7 sufficient -- adequate the evidence which the tribunal 8 itself presumed accurate would have to fall; that is, a 9 habeas court would never accord that presumption. 10 JUSTICE SOUTER: I have a quick question. I 11 don't want to interfere with his five minutes of 12 rebuttal. 13 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: We'll give you your 14 rebuttal time. 15 JUSTICE BREYER: Going back to 16 Justice Scalia's question on the precedent, suppose -- 17 and I'm going to be -- I'd like my mind to be clear on 18 this. I thought that the question asked was for you to 19 find an instance where there was no sovereignty of the 20 country and they issued the writ, and it was turning on 21 a technical thing. Whether that was how the question 22 was met or not, what I read here in these different 23 briefs is in 1759, Lord Mansfield, the case can issue -- 24 a writ of habeas corpus, no doubt the power could issue 25 it where the place is under the subjection of the crown 24 Alderson Reporting Company Official - Subject to Final Review 1 of England. Then Lord Sellers in Mwenya said subjection 2 is fully appropriate to the powers, that's habeas, 3 irrespective of territorial sovereignty or dominion, in 4 other words, non-technical. 5 In our case in Rasul, both the concurring 6 opinion and the majority opinion say things like the 7 reach of the writ depends not on formal notions of 8 territorial sovereignty, but on the practical questions. 9 Then they both list practical questions. 10 Now suppose we take that as the definition. 11 Now, can you find instances where the writ has been 12 issued by Britain in history to people who were not 13 citizens and who were not actually held in Britain? 14 MR. WAXMAN: Yes. 15 JUSTICE BREYER: They are -- 16 MR. WAXMAN: I will cite two examples. I 17 knew that there was one other thing I wanted to try on 18 Justice Scalia. One is -- and it's referenced in our 19 footnote -- you know, in 1777 and 1783, Parliament 20 suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus for 21 people on the high seas or out of the realm, 22 specifically directed at U.S. seamen, at American 23 seamen. And if the writ never extended to American 24 seamen on the high seas or out of the realm, there would 25 have been no point in suspending it. 25 Alderson Reporting Company Official - Subject to Final Review 1 Second of all, the common -- the high 2 court judges who were administering -- issuing the writ 3 for the benefit of detainees in India before it became a 4 sovereign possession were not exercising a statutory 5 authority, with all due respect to Justice Scalia. 6 There was a royal charter that granted 7 those judges the -- all of the common -- the 8 authority -- common law authorities of the Queen's 9 bench. 10 And as the Indian case law explicates, 11 and Sir John Chambers explains, one of those authorities 12 was the exercise of the writ of habeas corpus, not 13 mandamus, outside territories that were no part of the 14 Realm of England. 15 Those are the, I think -- I mean there 16 may be be something in -- 17 JUSTICE BREYER: The Spanish doctor, the 18 Swedish doctor, the Spanish sailors, the British spy, 19 they're all in this case. 20 MR. WAXMAN: Well, in this -- in this 21 country, In Re Felateau, which was decided only a few 22 years after the founding, not only was he an enemy 23 alien; he was granted release under the writ of habeas 24 corpus because, not being a citizen, he could not be 25 charged with treason, which was the basis for holding 26 Alderson Reporting Company Official - Subject to Final Review 1 him. 2 JUSTICE SCALIA: Where -- where was he held? 3 MR. WAXMAN: I think in Pennsylvania. Maybe 4 it was -- 5 JUSTICE SCALIA: Are you sure he was being 6 held in Pennsylvania? 7 MR. WAXMAN: It was the mid-Atlantic. 8 Excuse me? 9 JUSTICE SCALIA: I mean, you're being held 10 within the jurisdiction of the United States. I am 11 still waiting for a single case, other than the Indian 12 case which you mentioned which was under a statute, a 13 single case in which an alien that -- in a -- in a 14 territory not within the Crown, was granted habeas 15 corpus. 16 And it's not enough to say there was a 17 statute that applied on the seas. That's fine. Just 18 give me one case. There's not a single one in all of 19 this lengthy history. 20 MR. WAXMAN: Well, Justice Scalia, you're 21 asking me to discard the Indian cases, and I've -- I've 22 mentioned to you the cases that the majority of Indians 23 in Rasul relied on, the Earl of Crewe and Mwenya. I've 24 given you the two statutes. I think at this point I 25 have to plead exhaustion from remedies. 27 Alderson Reporting Company Official - Subject to Final Review 1 (Laughter.) 2 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Mr. Waxman, this 3 determination, whether it's sovereignty or subjugation 4 or control of non-sovereign territory, would, I expect, 5 have diplomatic consequences. It is, I think, typically 6 an act of war for one country to assert authority and 7 control over another country's jurisdiction. 8 And here we have Section 1005G where 9 Congress and the President have agreed that Guantanamo 10 Bay is not part of the United States, and, yet, you 11 would have this Court issue a ruling saying that it is 12 subject to the total, complete domination and control, 13 or whatever the factors are. 14 What is the reaction of the Cuban government 15 to be to that? 16 MR. WAXMAN: My -- I don't think it's in the 17 record here, but what is in the record are the terms of 18 the lease. And I don't really take it to be disputed 19 that Guantanamo is under the complete, utterly 20 exclusive, jurisdiction and control of the national 21 government of the United States. 22 That's in the lease, itself. The courts of 23 Cuba have so held. They have designated Guantanamo, 24 quote, "foreign territory" unless and until the United 25 States in its sole discretion chooses to vacate the 28 Alderson Reporting Company Official - Subject to Final Review 1 base. And -- 2 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: We -- there are -- 3 am I wrong that there are Cuban workers who come on to 4 the base and work? 5 MR. WAXMAN: I'm not sure whether there are, 6 or not, any longer. But unlike -- or if you take -- 7 they are not subject -- and it has never been contended 8 that they are subject -- to Cuban control with respect 9 to conduct that is subject to any law of the United 10 States. 11 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So if you have two 12 of those workers and they get into a fight over 13 something, one can't sue the other in Cuban courts? 14 MR. WAXMAN: Absolutely not, and this is the 15 key difference, I think, going to Justice Alito's 16 question. Under our established -- 17 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: What authority -- 18 what authority do you have for that: That such a suit 19 would not lie in the Cuban court? 20 MR. WAXMAN: Well, first of all, the terms 21 of the lease, and, second of all, I -- I don't know that 22 we cited -- I mean, somebody has cited decisions of the 23 Cuban Government, the judiciary and its executive, that 24 they don't exercise any jurisdiction over -- 25 JUSTICE STEVENS: The converse question is: 29 Alderson Reporting Company Official - Subject to Final Review 1 Could we prosecute a crime committed in Guantanamo by 2 Cubans? And the answer is yes. 3 MR. WAXMAN: The answer is certainly yes, 4 and if I can just make the point about bases elsewhere, 5 in Germany and Japan, for example, the status of -- this 6 is the only base, I believe, that -- you know, in 7 something other than an active war zone, that isn't the 8 subject of a status-of-forces agreement that very 9 specifically explicates both the judicial and executive 10 authority over acts that occur on the base. 11 And, for example, under our status-of-forces 12 agreement with Japan, it is entirely clear that if it is 13 a Japanese citizen or a Japanese national or conduct 14 that is subject to the laws of Japan, the Japanese 15 courts have jurisdiction. 16 JUSTICE KENNEDY: You're not heartened by 17 the prospect that the detainees could apply to the Cuban 18 courts, which would then hand process to the Commanding 19 General at Guantanamo? 20 (Laughter.) 21 MR. WAXMAN: Not particularly. Let's put it 22 this way: It has not occurred to us yet. 23 (Laughter). 24 MR. WAXMAN: I mean, this is in -- this is 25 in many respects a uniquely straightforward case. I 30 Alderson Reporting Company Official - Subject to Final Review 1 really didn't mean to be facetious when I said our 2 national control over Guantanamo is greater than it is 3 over a place in Kentucky, because there we have -- under 4 our system of federalism the Federal Government has 5 limited controls. 6 JUSTICE GINSBURG: I thought this was 7 decided in Rasul. That's why I am so puzzled by the 8 Government's position. I think Justice Kennedy said it 9 most clearly when he said that, well, in every practical 10 respect, Guantanamo Bay is U.S. territory; and whatever 11 Congress recently passed, they can't, as you pointed 12 out, change the terms of the lease. 13 MR. WAXMAN: Yes. I think that's right, and 14 I also think that, although it is correct, as 15 Justice Scalia pointed out at the outset, that the 16 decision in Rasul was a decision about the scope of 17 2241, which has now been amended, and the majority, at 18 least, rendered a decision on the basis of the statute, 19 nonetheless, the Court was construing 2241(c)(1), which 20 is in haec verba with Section 14 of the 1789 act. 21 There are other provisions of the habeas 22 statute like the civil war provisions that -- under 23 which this Court reviews State court convictions and 24 detentions. But the statute that this Court was 25 construing in Rasul was identical in language to the one 31 Alderson Reporting Company Official - Subject to Final Review 1 promulgated in the -- the very first judiciary act of 2 1789, which this Court has said in Bollman was an 3 instantiation, a positive enactment of the writ, that 4 was protected by the Constitution. 5 And so, while technically, the majority was 6 issuing a statutory ruling -- and we don't contend 7 otherwise -- inferentially, its conclusion must extend 8 to the -- the extent of the writ at common law. 9 Thank you. 10 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, 11 Mr. Waxman. We will give you five minutes for rebuttal. 12 General Clement. 13 ORAL ARGUMENT OF GENERAL PAUL D. CLEMENT, 14 ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT 15 GENERAL CLEMENT: Mr. Chief Justice, and may 16 it please the Court: 17 Since this Court's decision in Rasul, 18 Petitioners' status has been reviewed by a tribunal 19 modeled on Army Regulation 190-8, and Congress has 20 passed two statutes addressing Petitioners' rights. 21 Petitioners now have access to the Article 22 III courts and have a right to judicial review in the 23 D.C. Circuit. 24 That review encompasses preponderance 25 claims, claims that the military did not follow their 32 Alderson Reporting Company Official - Subject to Final Review 1 own regulations, and statutory and constitutional 2 claims. 3 JUSTICE STEVENS: General Clement, you said 4 it was modeled after 190-8. Is it identical to 190-8? 5 GENERAL CLEMENT: Justice Stevens, it is 6 virtually identical. If you look at pages 50 and 51 of 7 our brief, you'll see kind of a side-by-side comparison; 8 and the deviations are ones that, we would submit, 9 enhance the rights of the detainees in this particular 10 circumstance. 11 So they are given a right to a personal 12 representative, which is not something that Army 13 Regulation 190-8 provides. They are specifically 14 provided for the ability to submit documentary evidence. 15 JUSTICE STEVENS: How is that personal 16 representative chosen? 17 GENERAL CLEMENT: The personal 18 representative is assigned to the individual by the 19 military. 20 JUSTICE SOUTER: I mean is that personal 21 representative also under an obligation to report back 22 to the military anything that might be unfavorable to 23 the person he is supposedly representing? 24 GENERAL CLEMENT: Well, I don't know about 25 "unfavorable," but I think if there's -- certainly, if 33 Alderson Reporting Company Official - Subject to Final Review 1 there is material intelligence information, he is to 2 provide that information. 3 JUSTICE SOUTER: So he's not -- he is not in 4 the position of counsel, as we understand the term. 5 GENERAL CLEMENT: No. We are not trying to 6 make the point that the personal representative is a 7 counsel. We're just saying it is something that is 8 provided above and beyond 190-8 in terms of the 9 procedure; and there are other particulars as well, like 10 there is the notice of the charges in the unclassified 11 summaries that are provided. 12 Now, there's the complaint on the other side 13 that the unclassified summaries aren't particular 14 enough, but it is worth noting that that's something 15 that is provided here that's not specified by 190-8. 16 JUSTICE STEVENS: Under 190-8, does the 17 defendant have a right to counsel? 18 GENERAL CLEMENT: No, they do not, not under 19 the basic regulations of that. Now, Mr. Waxman 20 correctly indicated that in a particular instance in 21 Vietnam, counsel was provided in 190-8 proceedings, but 22 those are not provided by the basic 190-8 procedures. 23 And, I think it is worth -- 24 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: The DTA, see, is 25 unclear to me, anyway, on this question. You agree that 34 Alderson Reporting Company Official - Subject to Final Review 1 there is the authority under the DTA, and I assume under 2 the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in reviewing 3 those determinations, to order a release? 4 GENERAL CLEMENT: Well, I -- the way I would 5 answer that, Mr. Chief Justice, is this: In terms, the 6 DTA does not provide for an order of release. And we 7 would certainly have taken the position that, as a first 8 order, if the D.C. Circuit finds a defect in the CSTR, 9 we think the proper remedy would be to order a remand 10 for a new CSTR. 11 But, certainly, if this Court thinks that 12 the constitutional line is -- essentially necessitates 13 that the D.C. Circuit have the authority to order a 14 release, there is no obstacle to that. 15 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: 2243 doesn't specify 16 the availability of release, either, but it has 17 certainly been interpreted to authorize that by habeas 18 courts in this country. 19 GENERAL CLEMENT: No. And the D.C. Circuit 20 would have available to it the All Writs Act, and the 21 D.C. Circuit, in fact, in its Desmoula decision, which 22 is the decision where the Government has filed an en 23 banc petition -- that protective order that was issued 24 there was done pursuant to the All Writs Act. 25 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Yes, but that -- 35 Alderson Reporting Company Official - Subject to Final Review 1 GENERAL CLEMENT: The D.C. Circuit hasn't 2 been shy about asserting that authority. And, again, if 3 that's what was required here, they could use that 4 authority to order a release. 5 JUSTICE SOUTER: But doesn't the resort to 6 the All Writs Act beg the question? 7 And that is -- I mean the All Writs Act is 8 there to protect jurisdiction, and the question is 9 whether there is jurisdiction to release. 10 And you say there no textual impediment to 11 it; and, yet, we know -- I forget which brief it was in 12 -- from one of the briefs the -- the instance of the 13 prisoner Ali, one of the Chinese -- is it "Uigars"? Is 14 that how it is pronounced? 15 GENERAL CLEMENT: "Uigars." 16 JUSTICE SOUTER: Who was one of what, 12 or 17 13, who was found not to be an enemy combatant, and the 18 Government's position there was: Go back and do it 19 again in front of another tribunal, another panel, 20 which, in fact, conveniently found that he was. 21 So the practice of -- of the Government, it 22 seems to me, has clearly been to deny the right to 23 release. 24 GENERAL CLEMENT: Well, I would disagree, 25 Justice Souter. Let me say a couple of things to that. 36 Alderson Reporting Company Official - Subject to Final Review 1 One is that I think with respect to the 2 Uigars, in particular, there was a problem with ordering 3 release outright. And it is interesting that when Judge 4 Robertson, the same judge, district court judge, who 5 decided the Hamdan case, had before him one of the 6 Uigars in a habeas petition, he recognized that under 7 habeas he couldn't order release. 8 And the problem wasn't any kind of inherent 9 limitation on what he could order in his jurisdiction. 10 There was just a practical problem, which was -- 11 JUSTICE SOUTER: Okay. It was a practical 12 problem. But the fact is that the effectiveness of 13 habeas jurisdiction, for example, in requiring new 14 trials, and so on, depends upon the ultimate sanction, 15 which is the authority of the court to let somebody go 16 if the Government does not comply with a condition. 17 And the -- the Government practice so far 18 under the DTA seems quite contrary to that. 19 GENERAL CLEMENT: Well, again, Justice 20 Souter, what I would say is simply this: that if what 21 the Constitution requires to make the DTA to be an 22 adequate substitute is the power to order release, there 23 is no obstacle in the text of the DTA to that. And the 24 All Writs Act is available to allow them to order 25 release to protect their jurisdiction under the DTA. 37 Alderson Reporting Company Official - Subject to Final Review 1 And I think that would be a solution to that problem. 2 Now, I think, more broadly, let me -- let me 3 say about the DTA and the MCA, it really does represent 4 the best efforts of the political branches, both 5 political branches, to try to balance the interest in 6 providing the detainees in this admittedly unique 7 situation additional process with the imperative to 8 successfully prosecute the global war on terror. 9 JUSTICE BREYER: They get additional 10 process. The question, I guess, is whether it is an 11 adequate substitute for having withdrawn the writ of 12 habeas corpus. 13 On that question, suppose that you are from 14 Bosnia, and you are held for six years in Guantanamo, 15 and the charge is that you helped Al-Qaeda, and you had 16 your hearing before the CSRT. 17 And now you go to the D.C. Circuit, and here 18 is what you say: The CSRT is all wrong. Their 19 procedures are terrible. But just for purposes of 20 argument, I concede those procedures are wonderful, and 21 I also conclude it reached a perfectly good result. 22 Okay? So you concede it for argument's 23 sake. But what you want to say is: Judge, I don't care 24 how good those procedures are. I'm from Bosnia. I've 25 been here six years. The Constitution of the United 38 Alderson Reporting Company Official - Subject to Final Review 1 States does not give anyone the right to hold me six 2 years in Guantanamo without either charging me or 3 releasing me, in the absence of some special procedure 4 in Congress for preventive detention. 5 That's the argument I want to make. I don't 6 see anything in this CSRT provision that permits me to 7 make that argument. So I'm asking you: Where can you 8 make that argument? 9 GENERAL CLEMENT: I'm not sure that he could 10 make that argument. 11 JUSTICE BREYER: Exactly. 12 GENERAL CLEMENT: I'm not sure he can make 13 -- 14 JUSTICE BREYER: If he cannot make that 15 argument, how does this become an equivalent to habeas, 16 since that happens to be the argument that a large 17 number of these 305 people would like to make? 18 GENERAL CLEMENT: Well, Justice Breyer, let 19 me take it this way, which is, of course, you're getting 20 to the gravamen of their claim, which is that the DTA 21 and the review provided in the D.C. Circuit is not an 22 adequate substitute for habeas review. 23 And I'll start with the assumption for a 24 second, which I hope is right, because it seems that 25 Judge Friendly reached this conclusion -- and it seems 39 Alderson Reporting Company Official - Subject to Final Review 1 to me the right conclusion -- which is that the base 2 line is 1789. 3 And if you compare what these detainees have 4 under the DTA in terms of judicial review to what would 5 have been available to them at common law in 1789, it is 6 not even close. 7 This is the remarkable liberalization of the 8 writ, not some retrenchment or suspension of the writ. 9 These detainees at common law would face not one, but 10 three obstacles, to getting into court to make these 11 claims. The first, of course, is the geographical 12 limits on the reach of the writ. The second, but 13 equally important, is the line of authority that says 14 that the writ was simply unavailable to prisoners of 15 war. And the third problem would be the 16 well-established common law rule that you can't 17 controvert the facts as set forth in the return. 18 So at common law, somebody who took the 19 incredibly, I think, poor strategic call to concede all 20 of their legal arguments away and say only: I have a 21 constitutional claim here to be brought, I don't think 22 they would have gotten into court with that. 23 JUSTICE SOUTER: But aren't you simply 24 rearguing Rasul? 25 GENERAL CLEMENT: Not at all -- 40 Alderson Reporting Company Official - Subject to Final Review 1 JUSTICE SOUTER: We have passed that point; 2 haven't we? 3 GENERAL CLEMENT: Not at all, 4 Justice Souter. And, first of all -- I mean, I take it 5 your -- your principal objection goes to the 6 geographical writ point, because I think that the issues 7 about controverting the facts of the return and the 8 availability of the writs to prisoners of war is 9 something that really wasn't -- had any reason to be 10 before this Court in Rasul. 11 JUSTICE SOUTER: It -- it -- it wasn't, and 12 I didn't want to get into the prisoner of war point. 13 But if you want to get into it, the problem with your 14 prisoner of war point is the United States is not 15 treating them as prisoners of war. They have not been 16 adjudicated prisoners of war, or otherwise, under the 17 Third Geneva Convention, and that argument on the 18 Government's part is entirely circular. 19 GENERAL CLEMENT: With respect, Justice 20 Souter -- 21 JUSTICE GINSBURG: General Clement, I 22 remember in a prior hearing about Guantanamo that the 23 Government was taking the position firmly that these 24 detainees were not prisoners of war and, therefore, were 25 not entitled to the protection of the Geneva 41 Alderson Reporting Company Official - Subject to Final Review 1 conventions. 2 So if the Government is maintaining that 3 position, these people are not prisoners of war, then 4 the treatment of a prisoner of war is not relevant. 5 GENERAL CLEMENT: Well, with respect, 6 Justice Ginsburg and Justice Souter -- because I think 7 it gets to the same point -- we are using "prisoner of 8 war" the way that the common law courts use the term 9 "prisoner of war." 10 JUSTICE SCALIA: Is the Geneva Convention 11 modeled after the Constitution of the United States? 12 GENERAL CLEMENT: No, it -- 13 JUSTICE SCALIA: What it means by "prisoner 14 of war" is the same thing that the Constitution means? 15 GENERAL CLEMENT: Well, and -- and -- with 16 respect, the Framers in 1789 had the benefit of the 17 three Spanish soldiers and the Schiever case. They 18 didn't have the benefit of the Geneva Convention. 19 JUSTICE SOUTER: And the three Spanish 20 soldiers were -- were ultimately found to be prisoners 21 of war, And, yet, they had process to get into court. 22 There was no question of the jurisdiction of an English 23 court to entertain their claim. 24 GENERAL CLEMENT: The writ was denied, 25 Justice Souter. 42 Alderson Reporting Company Official - Subject to Final Review 1 JUSTICE SOUTER: The relief was denied. 2 GENERAL CLEMENT: No, the writ was denied. 3 JUSTICE SOUTER: That had a hearing under 4 the writ. 5 GENERAL CLEMENT: They did not have a 6 hearing. The writ was -- 7 JUSTICE SOUTER: Then how did the court ever 8 come to the conclusion that, in fact, they were 9 prisoners of war? 10 GENERAL CLEMENT: Because it said that -- it 11 looked at the pleading in the petition. There was no 12 hearing. It looked at the petition and it said: on 13 their own showing, they are prisoners of war. They are 14 denied the writ. 15 JUSTICE SOUTER: On their -- on their own 16 showing, but, in fact, the proceeding did not end until 17 the court had come to that conclusion. 18 It was not a conclusion that the court 19 assumed simply on the basis of a Government claim in the 20 return to the writ. 21 GENERAL CLEMENT: It didn't even ask for a 22 return, Justice Souter. I mean -- you know, they 23 decided the case -- 24 JUSTICE SOUTER: On the basis of a 25 Government claim formally or informally proffered to the 43 Alderson Reporting Company Official - Subject to Final Review 1 Court. They -- they came to that conclusion, as you 2 said, based on the -- on the prisoners' own showing. 3 But the court certainly -- there is no authority in the 4 prisoner of war case for saying that if the Government 5 make as claim that one is a prisoner of war -- contrary 6 to the Government's prior position, incidentally -- that 7 that forecloses the possibility of consideration under 8 the writ -- the petition as filed. 9 GENERAL CLEMENT: There is authority for 10 that proposition, Justice Souter. It comes along later 11 in the World War II cases in Britain. The reason 12 there's not authority contemporaneous with the 1759 13 cases is because these courts are operating with the 14 common-law rule you can't controvert the facts as set 15 forth in a return. So the petitioners in these cases 16 wisely didn't make a factual dispute; they made a legal 17 dispute. And the courts rejected it time and time 18 again. I thought the Spanish sailors and the Shiver -- 19 I'd like to just offer you that the 1941 authority -- 20 because this question of course, over time, by 1941, the 21 British courts have relaxed the rule against 22 controverting the facts of the return, and they 23 addressed this question about what kind of factual 24 inquiry is necessary when the government comes back and 25 says that somebody is an enemy combatant, a prisoner of 44 Alderson Reporting Company Official - Subject to Final Review 1 war, or, under the Emergency Detention Act of 1939, a 2 threat to the realm. 3 And in two cases, Liverridge against 4 Anderson and Green against Anderson, the law lords, in 5 1941, say that they are not going to look beyond what 6 the government has provided in the return. They're not 7 even, in the Green case, going to ask for an affidavit. 8 So if you're looking -- 9 JUSTICE SOUTER: Well, was that because they 10 were reflecting 1789 practice, or because they were 11 reflecting the Defense of the Realm Act? I don't know 12 the answer to that. 13 GENERAL CLEMENT: I think it is a pretty 14 good snapshot of where things were as of 1941. 15 JUSTICE SOUTER: Unless you can answer my 16 question, we don't know what the snapshot proves. 17 GENERAL CLEMENT: They were exercising 18 habeas jurisdiction. 19 JUSTICE SOUTER: They were exercising habeas 20 jurisdiction in a court -- in a polity in which 21 Parliament is supreme and Parliament had already passed 22 the Defense of the Realm Act, and I don't -- I mean it. 23 I don't know the answer to the question I asked you. 24 But I think unless we have an answer to that, we don't 25 have a reliable clue as to the understanding of the 45 Alderson Reporting Company Official - Subject to Final Review 1 English courts at a time that's relevant to our inquiry. 2 GENERAL CLEMENT: I think we do have an 3 answer, Justice Souter. It is in the Liverridge case, 4 because there there's a question of interpreting the 5 Emergency Detention Act. And they basically have a 6 choice. They can interpret it to allow the detention to 7 turn exclusively on the subjective belief of the home 8 secretary, or they can interpret it to reflect an 9 objective standard. And they choose, over the dissent 10 of Lord Atkins, they choose purely subject if standard. 11 So in interpreting a act of Parliament that could have 12 gone either way they interpreted under the common law 13 writ to involve no factual inquiry whatsoever. And the 14 case at common law in 1789 is a fortiori from that 15 because they would not go beyond the facts as set forth 16 in the return. And the only response the Petitioners 17 have to that common law rule is they can point to a 18 couple of cases where the courts were tempted and did 19 accede to the temptation to peek beyond the return in 20 the context of a child custody case or private custody 21 cases. 22 But this is a situation -- 23 JUSTICE BREYER: I thought we were here 24 talking about -- I see that you have a strong argument 25 and they'll have a strong argument in reply. I think 46 Alderson Reporting Company Official - Subject to Final Review 1 both are pretty good, how you interpret these cases. I 2 thought we were talking about what the availability of a 3 forum in which you can make your argument and they can 4 make their argument, and that's why I'm back to the 5 question of this is remedy that's given in the statute 6 sufficient to allow you to make your argument and their 7 to make their argument? And what you said was, when I 8 thought I produced an example of an instance they wanted 9 to argue quite strongly, and you said no, they couldn't. 10 Then you said well, neither could they in 11 England. Well, that I wonder. That's where I'm back 12 to. After all, England doesn't have a written 13 constitution. So it is hardly surprising if they 14 concede everything away in England, they're not going to 15 be able to make any argument. There's nothing left. 16 But let's image in England you had a statute and that 17 statute said the government cannot hold an alien in 18 Beckawannaland for six years without either charging 19 them or releasing them. Or except for -- and we have 20 some very detailed preventive detention. Suppose there 21 was a statute like that. And then our friends in 22 England in whatever year conceded every argument but 23 that one. 24 Now, are you going to tell me now that the 25 habeas courts would have said we won't even listen to 47 Alderson Reporting Company Official - Subject to Final Review 1 your argument? 2 GENERAL CLEMENT: As Justice Souter pointed 3 out -- I mean, if you assume that the statute also said 4 any review for that claim should be in the court of 5 appeals, not in the traditional -- 6 JUSTICE BREYER: Correct. And you told me 7 in this statute the court of appeals will not listen to 8 that argument. And as I read the statute, I agree with 9 you. Because I can find no place where they could make 10 that argument since it does not concern how well this 11 tribunal did, nor does it concern the constitutionality 12 of the procedures of the tribunal. 13 GENERAL CLEMENT: Well, Justice Breyer, as I 14 say, I think that if you accept that there would be some 15 deference to the ability to bring statutory claims, I 16 don't know why that deference would be limited to the 17 substance and not to the forum. 18 And Congress here has spoken. It has 19 spoken. The political branch has spoken. They have 20 struck a balance. They've given these detainees better 21 rights and access to administrative and judicial review. 22 Anyone -- 23 JUSTICE ALITO: If the Court holds that the 24 DTA is not an adequate substitute for habeas, what will 25 happen? Will these Petitioners then have access to all 48 Alderson Reporting Company Official - Subject to Final Review 1 of the procedures that normally apply in a habeas 2 proceeding under 2241? The same right to discovery, 3 subpoena witnesses, access to classified information, 4 presence in court? 5 GENERAL CLEMENT: The government will 6 certainly take the position that they are not entitled 7 to those things. Presumably the Petitioners will be 8 arguing they are entitled to those things. 9 The answers to those questions will be 10 unclear because the review provided by the DTA and the 11 habeas statute, if it is applied in this context, either 12 way, whatever the vehicle for that judicial review, it 13 will be unprecedented. And there will be difficult 14 questions that will need to be worked out, and I don't 15 understand why -- 16 JUSTICE SCALIA: General Clement, if we had 17 to either charge or release these people, what would 18 they be charged with? Waging war against the United 19 States? Is there a statute that prevents non-citizens 20 from waging war against the United States and provides 21 criminal penalties? 22 GENERAL CLEMENT: Not as such, 23 Justice Scalia. Now, of course, we might have an 24 argument as to some of these individuals, that they 25 engaged in unlawful -- 49 Alderson Reporting Company Official - Subject to Final Review 1 JUSTICE STEVENS: As I understand the 2 government's position, these people are not in uniform, 3 so they're not an under the law of war. They have all 4 committed murder, not just fighting a war. That's your 5 theory, I think. They are all committed war crimes. 6 Those that were caught on the battlefield, I mean. I'm 7 talking about those. 8 GENERAL CLEMENT: Right, and the ones that 9 actually killed somebody would have committed murder. 10 JUSTICE STEVENS: That's right. And they 11 are not prisoners of war under the law of war, because 12 they were not in uniform. 13 GENERAL CLEMENT: They don't qualify for 14 prisoner of war status, but just to be clear I think 15 certainly when the British cases are talking about -- 16 JUSTICE STEVENS: I'm talking about common 17 law. I mean under the law of war, the common law of 18 war. They were not prisoners of war. 19 GENERAL CLEMENT: They would not qualify for 20 prisoner of war status. They're enemy combatants -- 21 JUSTICE STEVENS: Their engaging in war-like 22 acts would be the crime of murder or the crime of 23 assault and so forth and so on. That's how I understand 24 your theory in one of these prosecutions is that not -- 25 GENERAL CLEMENT: That would be our theory 50 Alderson Reporting Company Official - Subject to Final Review 1 in those cases -- 2 JUSTICE STEVENS: I mean it is your theory? 3 GENERAL CLEMENT: That would be our theory 4 in those cases -- and it is our theory in those cases 5 we've chosen to prosecute -- 6 JUSTICE STEVENS: Right. 7 GENERAL CLEMENT: -- in the military 8 commissions, but there are other individuals with 9 respect to whom we don't have the right kind of evidence 10 in order to go with the full-blown military commission 11 trial, but we still have the option that this Court 12 recognized in Kirin and Hamdi and most particularly in 13 Kirin, not just to try people who are unlawful 14 combatants for their unlawful combatancy, but also to 15 hold them as we would hold anybody else who was captured 16 as preventative detention. 17 JUSTICE STEVENS: For the duration of 18 hostilities, if you can show that they are enemies. 19 GENERAL CLEMENT: Well, I think if we can 20 show that they were enemy combatants, that's exactly 21 right. 22 JUSTICE SOUTER: And you are operating today 23 under a broader concept, as I understand it, of "enemy 24 combatant"? 25 GENERAL CLEMENT: Than? I'm sorry? Broader 51 Alderson Reporting Company Official - Subject to Final Review 1 than what? 2 JUSTICE SOUTER: Than was indeed the case 3 for example in our early litigation, let alone at the 4 time of Kirin. 5 GENERAL CLEMENT: Well two things, 6 Justice Souter. One thing is that with respect to the 7 definition that the military commissions -- I'm sorry -- 8 that the C-Cert 7 apply, that is a broader definition, I 9 would quickly add though that with respect to the 10 majority of individuals -- I mean you have the 11 Petitioners from Bosnia that Mr. Waxman represents, but 12 most of these people were seized in Pakistan and 13 Afghanistan, and so the situation is not that different. 14 And obviously we would take the position to the extent 15 you have some concerns about the breadth of the 16 definition, what this Court -- what the plurality said 17 in Hamdi in footnote 1 gets it exactly right. The way 18 to deal with those concerns is in the adjudication of 19 particular cases which can take place under the DTA or 20 can take place in habeas. 21 And again I think the burden -- 22 JUSTICE SOUTER: But how can -- and this 23 again, maybe I should know the answer to this, but I 24 don't. How could that be litigated under the DTA? 25 Doesn't any proceeding under the DTA simply have to 52 Alderson Reporting Company Official - Subject to Final Review 1 accept the statutory definition? 2 GENERAL CLEMENT: No, it does not. I mean 3 it's a regulatory -- 4 JUSTICE SOUTER: You mean -- you're saying 5 if it gets to the court of appeals, they can raise the 6 constitutional claim that the definition is broader than 7 constitutionally could be enforced. Is that what you're 8 saying? 9 GENERAL CLEMENT: That was in my points, 10 Justice Souter. So I think that -- 11 JUSTICE KENNEDY: I didn't understand that 12 point when you were having your colloquy with 13 Justice Breyer, either. I thought you were going to 14 answer to Justice Breyer, that the court of appeals does 15 have the right to determine whether to the extent the 16 Constitution and the laws of the United States are 17 applicable, whether such standards and procedures, such 18 as CSRT, are -- - to make the determination -- are 19 consistent with the Constitution -- 20 GENERAL CLEMENT: Yes, Justice -- 21 JUSTICE KENNEDY: -- that's provided in the 22 MCA. 23 GENERAL CLEMENT: It absolutely is. I think 24 Justice Breyer's hypothetical was cleverly crafted, 25 though, to take that off the table. 53 Alderson Reporting Company Official - Subject to Final Review 1 JUSTICE BREYER: It wasn't cleverly 2 redrafted. I wanted to say that the people I'm thinking 3 of are not challenging those procedures. What they say 4 is you could have the best procedure in the world, and 5 they're totally constitutional -- we'll assume that -- 6 they're assuming it. They're not going to concede it. 7 They're assuming it. 8 On that assumption, we still think that 9 Congress, the President, the Supreme Court under the 10 law, cannot hold us for six years without either trying 11 us, releasing us, or maybe confining us under some 12 special statute involving preventive detention and 13 danger which has not yet been enacted. 14 JUSTICE KENNEDY: But the statute -- 15 JUSTICE BREYER: They are arguing it. 16 JUSTICE KENNEDY: But the statute talks 17 about standards. Why can't that question that 18 Justice Breyer raised be reached by the Court of Appeals 19 under the CSRT review hearings when it determines the 20 constitutional adequacy of the standards, or am I 21 missing something? 22 GENERAL CLEMENT: Well, I think, again, that 23 Justice Breyer's hypothetical, as I understood it, sort 24 of assumed away the adequacy of all of the standards and 25 just said: Putting all of that to one side, I have some 54 Alderson Reporting Company Official - Subject to Final Review 1 other constitutional claim. 2 And I'm just not so sure that habeas ever 3 allowed you to sort of bring every claim that you 4 possibly wanted to; and I think the -- what I -- the way 5 I read this Court's Hamdi decision is what was 6 envisioned on a habeas case in a case where Army 7 Regulation 190-8, which, of course, the plurality cited, 8 was complied with. It was in that case: The habeas 9 petition in court would take that as a starting point, 10 and that you wouldn't necessarily be able to say: Look, 11 it was nice that we had that proceeding, but put that to 12 one side. I have another claim. 13 I don't think the court, even in habeas, 14 would have envisioned that that would go forward. 15 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Just one more question on 16 that point: Would the Court of Appeals in -- under the 17 MCA have the authority to question the constitutionality 18 of the definition of noncombatant -- of unlawful 19 combatant? 20 GENERAL CLEMENT: Absolutely, 21 Justice Kennedy. That would be available to them in the 22 D.C. Circuit. 23 JUSTICE STEVENS: General Clement, I thought 24 your answer to Justice Breyer -- and maybe I'm missing 25 something -- would be that there is a third alternative 55 Alderson Reporting Company Official - Subject to Final Review 1 which he didn't consider, namely: That these are 2 combatants picked up on the battlefield, and they may be 3 detained indefinitely without proving they committed a 4 crime. 5 And that is your position, I think. 6 GENERAL CLEMENT: That is our position. I 7 mean I want to give Justice Breyer's hypothetical its 8 due. I mean there might be claims that you could have 9 brought, hypothetical claims that you could have brought 10 at some level, and that the DTA does -- 11 JUSTICE STEVENS: You have a hypothetical 12 claim that a particular prisoner says: I was kidnapped 13 by people who were not in the United States Army and 14 sold for a bounty. And I am -- I just happened to be 15 there when I got kidnapped. 16 And then there is a genuine question of fact 17 as to whether the fact that they may have been sold in 18 that manner justifies detention, which is a different 19 question entirely from whether they committed a 20 violation under the law of war. 21 GENERAL CLEMENT: Absolutely, 22 Justice Stevens. But that question, of course, can be 23 considered by the D.C. Circuit on review, because 24 they're specifically entitled to a preponderance review 25 in the D.C. Circuit. So that's a claim that they 56 Alderson Reporting Company Official - Subject to Final Review 1 clearly could bring. 2 They can also bring the statutory and 3 constitutional claims to the standards and procedures, 4 and they can make claims that the procedures that are 5 set forth in the CSRTs are not provided. And I think, 6 again, if you compare that to what they would have had 7 at the common law, and you ask the question -- 8 JUSTICE STEVENS: Let me interrupt again, 9 and I know your argument. But with respect to those 10 claims, do you make the argument in your brief that some 11 evidence is enough to refute that claim, or do you say 12 it is a preponderance standard? 13 GENERAL CLEMENT: It's a preponderance 14 standard, and that's what is set forth in the statute. 15 And, again, that's something where Congress specifically 16 got involved in the CSRTs in a way that I think is 17 different from the Hamdan case and Congress's 18 involvement with the Military Commissions. In the 19 Military Commissions -- 20 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I suppose any 21 challenges to the adequacy of the standards, or 22 whatever, are the sort of things that would be raised in 23 the D.C. Circuit. And we don't know what that's going 24 to look like yet, because the D.C. Circuit hasn't had an 25 opportunity to rule on those. 57 Alderson Reporting Company Official - Subject to Final Review 1 GENERAL CLEMENT: That's exactly right, 2 Mr. Chief Justice. And that's why, as we say in the 3 brief -- I mean there's a sense in which this is really 4 a facial challenge. 5 I mean, in order for them to prevail with 6 the argument that DTA review is an inadequate 7 substitute, they really have to say that it is 8 inherently an inadequate substitute. That no matter 9 kind of how many times the D.C. Circuit cuts the 10 Petitioner a break -- 11 JUSTICE STEVENS: Isn't the main issue the 12 fact that it has taken six years to have the issue 13 resolved -- "relevant" -- 14 GENERAL CLEMENT: Well, I mean -- 15 JUSTICE STEVENS: They say they have 16 been unlawfully detained for six years from the 17 beginning. And isn't that delay relevant to the 18 question of whether they have been provided such a 19 wonderful set of procedures? 20 GENERAL CLEMENT: Well, Justice Stevens, I 21 think the delay is going to be relevant to whether or 22 not courts should expedite hearings, and the like. But 23 I don't think it should cloud the basic constitutional 24 question before this Court. 25 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: The procedures that 58 Alderson Reporting Company Official - Subject to Final Review 1 are before us under the DTA and the MCA, of course, 2 weren't available for the whole six-year period, were 3 they? 4 GENERAL CLEMENT: No, of course not. And I 5 think it is worth recognizing that Congress legislated 6 in this area not in year one, and then six years have 7 gone by. Congress legislated with these particular 8 procedures and this level of review in years four and 9 five. 10 And the fact that they didn't immediately 11 take effect, I think, is not an accident. It is a 12 product of the fact that Congress in this area was 13 providing unprecedented review. 14 JUSTICE GINSBURG: General -- 15 GENERAL CLEMENT: And, of course, when you 16 do something unprecedented, new questions will arise. 17 JUSTICE GINSBURG: I think, to go back to 18 the beginning, my notion of your position was you never 19 get to that question: Is the review of these procedures 20 adequate in the D.C. Circuit, because there is no 21 authority, period, for the D.C. Circuit to engage -- to 22 grant what is before us is if the -- our applications 23 for a writ of habeas corpus. 24 You say that's out the door. They might 25 bring some other proceedings. I thought that was your 59 Alderson Reporting Company Official - Subject to Final Review 1 position. 2 GENERAL CLEMENT: I think that is our 3 position, Justice Ginsburg. But our position is they 4 want -- they styled something -- they filed something 5 called a habeas petition. Congress subsequently has 6 come in and said: The way we are going to deal with 7 this is we are going to remove jurisdiction for that 8 habeas petition, and we're going to allow you to file a 9 DTA review provision -- a DTA review petition. 10 Now, their argument is that Congress can't 11 force that choice on them because this is an inadequate 12 substitute for habeas. The Suspension Clause applies in 13 Guantanamo; and therefore, the DTA is effectively 14 unconstitutional to the extent it prevents us with 15 proceeding with our habeas petition. 16 Now, there are a variety of ways this Court 17 could reject that claim. It seems to me that the most 18 straightforward way, though, is to simply ask the 19 question: If the level of review provided by the DTA in 20 the DTA petition were provided by statute in 1789 or 21 even 1941, for that matter, would it have been seen as a 22 liberalization of the writ, or a contraction and 23 suspension of the writ? 24 And I think it is very, very clear that if 25 this statute had passed, if this kind of review was 60 Alderson Reporting Company Official - Subject to Final Review 1 provided in 1789 or in 1941, it would have been greeted 2 as a remarkable -- remarkable liberalization of the writ 3 as it had then been understood. 4 And I think we are in the situation where 5 these individuals, for the first time, are really 6 allowed this kind of access to the court system. 7 And when that happens, there are going to be 8 difficult questions. We have difficult questions about 9 what the record on review is. We have difficult 10 questions about the extent to which classified 11 information should come in. 12 But all of those difficult questions are 13 going to be waiting for us if we go back to the habeas 14 courts, because the same kind of issues -- 15 JUSTICE BREYER: Well, on that -- and you 16 just mentioned remedy. Suppose, contrary to what you 17 hope for, that the Court were to say that this is -- we 18 have a minute or two. 19 Suppose they were to say that this is an 20 unconstitutional suspension of the writ, and that the 21 remedy here written in the statute is not adequate in 22 respect to many claims that might be made. 23 On that assumption, the habeas would lie. 24 Now, it has been six years, and habeas is supposed to be 25 speedy. 61 Alderson Reporting Company Official - Subject to Final Review 1 And, yet, people have serious arguments, 2 anyway, that they are being held for six years without 3 even having those arguments heard. 4 Is there anything in your opinion that this 5 Court could say by way of remedy that could get the 6 D.C. Circuit or the others to decide this and the CSRT 7 claims, there are 305 people to do this quickly within a 8 period of months rather than six more years? And if so, 9 what? 10 GENERAL CLEMENT: I mean, obviously lower 11 courts take anything this Court says very, very 12 seriously. So, if this Court makes it clear -- 13 JUSTICE BREYER: Are we faced with this 14 problem, and I don't want to put you right on the spot, 15 what approximately would you say in respect to this? 16 Because it is a serious problem. 17 GENERAL CLEMENT: Well, I mean -- let me -- 18 if I could, I would answer it as to what this Court 19 should say about what the D.C. Circuit should do on DTA 20 review. I prefer to discuss the opinion where we win 21 rather than the opinion where we lose. 22 As to that opinion, the courts -- the lower 23 courts should be instructed to with due cognizance for 24 the fact these individuals have been detained six years 25 and this is the process that has been provided in order 62 Alderson Reporting Company Official - Subject to Final Review 1 to decide whether or not that continuing custody is 2 lawful, they should expedite this to the greatest extent 3 possible. 4 JUSTICE KENNEDY: How can we fit your 5 position when we have no jurisdiction here? 6 JUSTICE SOUTER: If you win, we never get to 7 these issues. 8 GENERAL CLEMENT: With respect if you win -- 9 if we win, you still write an opinion saying that we 10 win, and that opinion can still say everything -- 11 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Our opinion says have a 12 nice day, everybody. 13 (Laughter.) 14 JUSTICE SOUTER: You can't win without 15 reversing the Court of Appeals. 16 GENERAL CLEMENT: You can certainly affirm 17 on alternative grounds. 18 JUSTICE SOUTER: If we affirmed on 19 alternative grounds, leaving the court of appeals' 20 reasoning as it stands, these interesting questions that 21 you referred to will never arise. 22 GENERAL CLEMENT: I don't think that's 23 right, Justice Souter. There is active litigation going 24 on in the D.C. Circuit over basically these questions 25 and how this litigation is going to take place. And if 63 Alderson Reporting Company Official - Subject to Final Review 1 this Court in affirming on -- begrudgingly affirming and 2 directing the D.C. Circuit to move with all appropriate 3 dispatch, that's going to be read just as carefully and 4 taken just as seriously if it's an affirmance than if 5 it's a vacate or a reversal. 6 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Is that because the 7 withdrawal of jurisdiction does not apply to review of 8 the proceedings in the D.C. Circuit that's provided 9 under the statute? In other words, your argument that 10 the habeas jurisdiction doesn't extend doesn't reach the 11 review of the adequacy of the DTA proceedings? 12 GENERAL CLEMENT: That's exactly right. 13 That's exactly right. 14 JUSTICE SOUTER: Why would they litigate 15 that adequacy if they have determined in advance that 16 substantively the individuals who are petitioning have 17 absolutely no rights? 18 GENERAL CLEMENT: They hadn't decided that, 19 Justice Souter. That might have been a problem back in 20 Rasul. But now whatever the answer to the question of 21 whether the Constitution provides rights in Guantanamo, 22 they have rights. They have the statutory right to 23 preponderance review. They have a statutory right to 24 have the military follow its own procedures. And they 25 have lots of arguments in the lower courts trying to 64 Alderson Reporting Company Official - Subject to Final Review 1 take advantage of those rights that they have. 2 So there will be a meaningful procedure in 3 the D.C. Circuit -- 4 JUSTICE SOUTER: At the end of the day, the 5 only thing, as I understand it, that could possibly be 6 adjudicated would be the question of formal adherence to 7 procedure or not. There would never be an adjudication 8 that ever went to the merits because the merits issue, 9 as I understand it, is already -- I mean merits of 10 relief -- have already been prior admitted by the 11 existing determination of the circuit in this case. 12 GENERAL CLEMENT: Well, Justice Souter, I'm 13 not sure that this Court -- I understand your question, 14 I believe, which is that the D.C. Circuit, I think, 15 almost unavoidably reading this Court's Rasul decision 16 and reading it as a statutory rather than a 17 constitutional holding, has stuck with its circuit 18 precedent and said that there aren't constitutional 19 rights here. That is going to be true unless this Court 20 reverses it in habeas or in the DTA review. 21 It would seem particularly strange that if 22 that's the real problem that this Court would somehow 23 decide, well, you know, we really think the DTA is an 24 adequate substitute, but the only way we can correct 25 this other mistake, in our view, that the D.C. Circuit 65 Alderson Reporting Company Official - Subject to Final Review 1 is laboring under is to rule against the government. 2 JUSTICE SOUTER: You were arguing that the 3 question of the adequacy of the substitution should, in 4 fact, be litigated in a plenary fashion in the Court of 5 Appeals or the district court for that matter? 6 GENERAL CLEMENT: No. I think that's the 7 issue before this Court now. And this Court, for 8 example -- 9 JUSTICE SOUTER: I thought you said a moment 10 ago that there were all of these interesting questions 11 that could be explored if there was a remand? 12 GENERAL CLEMENT: I'm sorry, Justice Souter, 13 I may have misspoke. 14 JUSTICE SOUTER: Maybe I misunderstood you. 15 GENERAL CLEMENT: The interesting questions 16 that I think are left on the remand, no matter what, are 17 issues about whether or not based on the Abraham 18 declaration that the military followed their own 19 procedures for assembling the record below, or whether 20 the military followed its own procedures for providing 21 exculpatory evidence. Those are all questions that 22 aren't questions that require the answer to the question 23 of whether Eisentrager is still good law -- 24 JUSTICE SOUTER: You are talking about in 25 effect about evidentiary procedural questions? 66 Alderson Reporting Company Official - Subject to Final Review 1 GENERAL CLEMENT: I mean -- 2 JUSTICE GINSBURG: You're talking about 3 taking the statute, Congress's statute that set up this 4 system with limited review in the D.C. Circuit and 5 saying that's it. The D.C. Circuit never got to that 6 question because it said the acts that these people are 7 trying to bring habeas doesn't exist. The only thing 8 that they have, the only remedy they have is the one 9 that Congress provided. And it seems to me the only 10 question before us is whether there is jurisdiction in 11 the court of appeals to decide that threshold issue. 12 They tossed it out and didn't reach -- didn't say one 13 word about the adequacy of the procedures or of the 14 things that you're talking about. 15 GENERAL CLEMENT: I think that's right, 16 Justice Ginsburg. I want to be clear that my position 17 is that an alternative ground for affirmance, which 18 would allow this Court to address some of those 19 questions, is that the D.C. Circuit was right to say 20 that the DTA review, that the habeas petition should be 21 dismissed. The reason they were right is because the 22 DTA is an adequate substitute for habeas. 23 JUSTICE GINSBURG: That would be -- we would 24 be deciding that as a court of first view because they 25 didn't decide that? You don't need an adequate 67 Alderson Reporting Company Official - Subject to Final Review 1 substitute for habeas because you have no right to 2 habeas. 3 GENERAL CLEMENT: I think that's a fair 4 observation, but obviously this Court -- 5 JUSTICE STEVENS: General Clement -- 6 GENERAL CLEMENT: In the context -- I mean 7 this has been fully briefed in, and in the context of 8 where the Court uses an alternative ground for 9 affirmance, it would not be a novel situation, I don't 10 think. 11 JUSTICE STEVENS: General Clement, your 12 suggested reason why they're right is quite different 13 from the reason they actually gave. They did not reach 14 the question of the adequacy of these procedures. 15 GENERAL CLEMENT: I think that's a fair 16 point, Justice Stevens, though I would say that really 17 their reasoning encapsulates one of the three reasons 18 why at common law they were right. 19 JUSTICE STEVENS: Yes, but they did not 20 reach this very important part of the whole case. And, 21 Of course, the substitute procedures here are not nearly 22 the same as those in our prior cases of where we 23 sustained the 2255 and district here. 24 GENERAL CLEMENT: Oh, that's right, 25 Justice Stevens, but in fairness, in those situations 68 Alderson Reporting Company Official - Subject to Final Review 1 you were dealing with sort of substitutes for core 2 habeas under situations where they're was no dispute 3 that there was a robust right to habeas at common law, 4 and so here you first deal with the situation of -- all 5 right, the baseline is, as Judge Friendly suggests, 6 1789, is this an adequate substitute? And that even if 7 somehow -- and I don't know how you get past that -- 8 then you I think still might ask the question that this 9 Court asked in the Felker case, which is, you know, 10 giving some deference to Congress's ability to shape the 11 scope of the writ, is there a problem here? I think we 12 would point the Court to Felker. 13 JUSTICE STEVENS: And you say those later 14 cases are not relevant because habeas corpus in the 15 modern world is much broader than it was in 1789. 16 That's part of your point? 17 GENERAL CLEMENT: That is part of our point. 18 JUSTICE STEVENS: Yes. 19 GENERAL CLEMENT: And we would say, though 20 -- 21 JUSTICE STEVENS: And the comparison you ask 22 us to make is between what the habeas writ was in 1789, 23 not what the comparison to a habeas writ would be today? 24 GENERAL CLEMENT: We would start with that 25 proposition, but I think this isn't a case where it's 69 Alderson Reporting Company Official - Subject to Final Review 1 just 1789 versus today because as I read this -- - 2 JUSTICE STEVENS: I don't think you would 3 seriously contend that the procedures set forth in the 4 statute are equivalent to those afforded under the 5 habeas writ under today's jurisdiction? 6 GENERAL CLEMENT: It's a hard question for 7 me to answer -- - 8 JUSTICE STEVENS: At least you haven't 9 argued that. 10 GENERAL CLEMENT: Well, no, but I mean the 11 question is, you know, in a different case, sure, there 12 would be a different habeas. But we don't know sort of 13 the answer as to what habeas looks like in the context 14 of enemy combatants detained in a place like Guantanamo, 15 and we suggest, based on our best reading of Hamdi that, 16 if there was habeas jurisdiction now, that the 17 proceeding that would unfold would not be the plenary 18 habeas that is envisioned by Petitioners but would be a 19 much more narrowly circumscribed habeas. I would also 20 point out that, again, it's not just -- 21 JUSTICE STEVENS: On the point I made, I 22 think that's critical to your argument that the 23 substitute is adequate. 24 GENERAL CLEMENT: I think that's right. I 25 would say, though, that our only baseline is not 1789 70 Alderson Reporting Company Official - Subject to Final Review 1 because, as we read this Court's decision in Rasul, 2 Rasul is based on the predicate that until 1973 and 3 Braden's overruling of Ahrens, that the habeas statute 4 would not have gone to Guantanamo. And unless this 5 Court is willing to say that there was an inchoate 6 Suspension Clause violation until 1973 when Braden comes 7 along, it seems like the tradition in this country too, 8 based on the immediate custodian rule and the 9 territorial jurisdiction of the courts, was that habeas 10 in Guantanamo is a novelty. It's -- 1973 at best. 11 If I could finish with just bringing the 12 Court's attention to one thing. This is in an amicus 13 brief that is in support of us, the Criminal Justice 14 Legal Foundation brief. But there's sufficiently little 15 precedence for the Court to rely on, and I want the 16 Court to have this: The Schiever case, which is one of 17 the prisoner-of-war cases. There's not -- in the Rasul 18 case, Justice Stevens, and the parties, we both cited to 19 volume 97 of English Reporter and the report of the case 20 by Burrow -- there is in the English Reports an 21 alternative report of that case, from Kenyon. And the 22 report of that case which is 96 English Reports 1249 is 23 actually longer on the law, shorter on the facts, but 24 longer on the law than the report by Lord Burrow. So I 25 wanted the court to have that available to them. 71 Alderson Reporting Company Official - Subject to Final Review 1 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, 2 General Clement. 3 Mr. Waxman, we'll give you five minutes. 4 REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF SETH W. WAXMAN. 5 ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS 6 MR. WAXMAN: Thank you, Your Honor. 7 I want to speak mostly about the adequacy of 8 the substitute and particularly the question that you 9 and Justice Kennedy asked about adjudication of the 10 standard on remand, but just to take first things first, 11 I don't -- I don't believe I've ever seen the 12 government's -- the case Liverridge or Green cases cited 13 by the government before. And I don't know what they 14 say. But it is absolutely incorrect that DTA review of 15 the CSRTs is a liberalization of the traditional writ. 16 As this Court made -- or the King's Bench made clear in 17 the Bushell's case and all of the commentators including 18 Sharpe, who both sides are citing as authoritative, here 19 agree in cases of executive detention, where there 20 wasn't a trial occurring, the court absolutely could -- 21 the prisoner could controvert the facts of the return in 22 Schiever and Spanish Citizens -- Spanish Prisoners, 23 there wasn't an original hearing because the court 24 issued -- sat as nisi prius court and considered 25 affidavits of the prisoners and third parties and 72 Alderson Reporting Company Official - Subject to Final Review 1 determined on the basis of the affidavits that they were 2 prisoners of war. 3 But it is absolutely clear that the writ did 4 extend to the question of "I am not a combatant. I am 5 not a warrior, number one. And number two, it did go in 6 non-criminal detentions to the underlying facts of the 7 detention, and that goes to the point about the standard 8 that Justice Kennedy asked and the Chief Justice asked. 9 We agree that, if and when the D.C. Circuit 10 ever addresses the merits of these cases, and not only 11 is there no CSR -- complete record on return in any 12 case, but the government has suggested they proceed five 13 at a time, and we're now two years running without a 14 single one -- but there's no doubt that the argument 15 we're making in Roman numeral 2 of our brief, that the 16 CSR, the Wolfowitz definition is not authorized 17 detention under the AUMF, which as this Court in Hamdi 18 said, incorporates long-established law-of-war 19 principles and American traditions. 20 We can raise that claim because they have to 21 establish that the procedures and standards were 22 consistent not only with the Constitution but also with 23 the laws of the United States. And the problem this is 24 this -- 25 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: That is an argument 73 Alderson Reporting Company Official - Subject to Final Review 1 that, I gather, both sides agree is available to you 2 under the DTA before the D.C. Circuit. 3 MR. WAXMAN: That is absolutely correct. 4 But what -- what habeas at its core was -- and we're 5 talking -- I'm happy to live in the world of 1789 now -- 6 is executive detention and not the more modern 7 innovations where, well, certain procedures weren't 8 constitutional or whatever, but you have no right to 9 hold me. The facts won't allow you to hold me. The 10 D.C. Circuit cannot -- 11 JUSTICE KENNEDY: What does that tell you 12 about the adequacy of the substitute? 13 MR. WAXMAN: Because the D.C. Circuit -- 14 because the D.C. Circuit is reviewing a record that was 15 adduced ex parte, in camera, with a presumption to boot 16 that it is -- that the evidence is both accurate and 17 complete, and the D.C. Circuit is -- has already said it 18 will not hear any new evidence and it must apply that 19 same presumption that that evidence that was heard ex 20 parte in camera with its own presumption is correct. 21 And here's -- let me just give you an example of what 22 difference this makes. You have the unredacted version 23 of Judge Green's district court opinion. I don't. She 24 discusses -- she does address the adequacy of the 25 substitute. And she addresses the case of two 74 Alderson Reporting Company Official - Subject to Final Review 1 individuals. One is Mr. Ait-Idir, who is my client, and 2 you have both in her opinion and our brief this truly 3 Kafka-esque colloquy at his hearing in which he is 4 accused of associating with a known Al-Qaeda operative, 5 which he denies, but he can't be told the name. 6 Mr. Kurnaz is the other Petitioner who is 7 discussed in her brief. He was a Petitioner in this 8 Court, but he has since been released by the government 9 because of the fact that he had what the CSRTs won't 10 give him, which is a lawyer. He was told, two years 11 after he was detained -- he's a German permanent 12 resident -- he was told at his CSRT, as many of these 13 individuals were not, that he was being held because he 14 associated with a known terrorist. And he was told the 15 name. 16 He was told that he associated with somebody 17 called Selcook Bilgen who, the government contended, was 18 (a) a terrorist, who was -- had blown himself up while 19 Mr. Kurnaz was in detention -- may I simply finish this 20 account -- while he was in detention and in a suicide 21 bombing; and all that Mr. Kurnaz could say at his CSRT 22 where he had no lawyer and had no access to information 23 was I never had any reason to suspect he was a 24 terrorist. 25 Well, when the government, in the habeas 75 Alderson Reporting Company Official - Subject to Final Review 1 proceedings, filed its factual return in Judge Green's 2 court, it filed as its factual return the CSRT record. 3 His counsel saw that accusation. Within 24 hours, his 4 counsel had affidavits not only from the German 5 prosecutor but from the supposedly deceased Mr. Bilgen, 6 who is a resident of Dresden never involved in terrorism 7 and fully getting on with his life. 8 That's what -- and that evidence would not 9 have been allowed in under DTA review. It wouldn't have 10 been in the CSRT, and it won't come in under DTA review. 11 And that's why it is inadequate. 12 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, 13 Mr. Waxman. 14 The case is submitted. 15 (Whereupon, at 11:24 a.m., the case in the 16 above-entitled matter was submitted.) 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 76
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