No Easy Answers

Tuesday, September 26, 2006

National Intelliegence Estimate Declassified Sept 26, 2006

September 26, 2006
Declassified Key Judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate


Declassified Key Judgments of the National
Intelligence Estimate "Trends in Global Terrorism:
Implications for the United States" dated April 2006

Key Judgments
United States-led counterterrorism efforts have seriously damaged the leadership of
al-Qa'ida and disrupted its operations; however, we judge that al-Qa'ida will continue to
pose the greatest threat to the Homeland and US interests abroad by a single terrorist
organization. We also assess that the global jihadist movement--which includes al-
Qa'ida, affiliated and independent terrorist groups, and emerging networks and cells--is
spreading and adapting to counterterrorism efforts.

   ·   Although we cannot measure the extent of the spread with precision, a large body
       of all-source reporting indicates that activists identifying themselves as jihadists,
       although a small percentage of Muslims, are increasing in both number and
       geographic dispersion.

   ·   If this trend continues, threats to US interests at home and abroad will become
       more diverse, leading to increasing attacks worldwide.

   ·   Greater pluralism and more responsive political systems in Muslim majority
       nations would alleviate some of the grievances jihadists exploit. Over time, such
       progress, together with sustained, multifaceted programs targeting the
       vulnerabilities of the jihadist movement and continued pressure on al-Qa'ida,
       could erode support for the jihadists.

We assess that the global jihadist movement is decentralized, lacks a coherent global
strategy, and is becoming more diffuse. New jihadist networks and cells, with anti-
American agendas, are increasingly likely to emerge. The confluence of shared purpose
and dispersed actors will make it harder to find and undermine jihadist groups.

   ·   We assess that the operational threat from self-radicalized cells will grow in
       importance to US counterterrorism efforts, particularly abroad but also in the

   ·   The jihadists regard Europe as an important venue for attacking Western interests.
       Extremist networks inside the extensive Muslim diasporas in Europe facilitate
       recruitment and staging for urban attacks, as illustrated by the 2004 Madrid and
       2005 London bombings.

We assess that the Iraq jihad is shaping a new generation of terrorist leaders and
operatives; perceived jihadist success there would inspire more fighters to continue the
struggle elsewhere.

   ·   The Iraq conflict has become the "cause celebre" for jihadists, breeding a deep
       resentment of US involvement in the Muslim world and cultivating supporters for
       the global jihadist movement. Should jihadists leaving Iraq perceive themselves,
       and be perceived, to have failed, we judge fewer fighters will be inspired to carry
       on the fight.

We assess that the underlying factors fueling the spread of the movement outweigh its
vulnerabilities and are likely to do so for the duration of the timeframe of this Estimate.

   ·   Four underlying factors are fueling the spread of the jihadist movement: (1)
       Entrenched grievances, such as corruption, injustice, and fear of Western
       domination, leading to anger, humiliation, and a sense of powerlessness; (2) the
       Iraq "jihad;" (3) the slow pace of real and sustained economic, social, and
       political reforms in many Muslim majority nations; and (4) pervasive anti-US
       sentiment among most Muslims--all of which jihadists exploit.

Concomitant vulnerabilities in the jihadist movement have emerged that, if fully exposed
and exploited, could begin to slow the spread of the movement. They include
dependence on the continuation of Muslim-related conflicts, the limited appeal of the
jihadists' radical ideology, the emergence of respected voices of moderation, and
criticism of the violent tactics employed against mostly Muslim citizens.

   ·   The jihadists' greatest vulnerability is that their ultimate political solution--an
       ultra-conservative interpretation of shari'a-based governance spanning the
       Muslim world--is unpopular with the vast majority of Muslims. Exposing the
       religious and political straitjacket that is implied by the jihadists' propaganda
       would help to divide them from the audiences they seek to persuade.

   ·   Recent condemnations of violence and extremist religious interpretations by a few
       notable Muslim clerics signal a trend that could facilitate the growth of a
       constructive alternative to jihadist ideology: peaceful political activism. This also
       could lead to the consistent and dynamic participation of broader Muslim
       communities in rejecting violence, reducing the ability of radicals to capitalize on
       passive community support. In this way, the Muslim mainstream emerges as the
       most powerful weapon in the war on terror.

   ·   Countering the spread of the jihadist movement will require coordinated
       multilateral efforts that go well beyond operations to capture or kill terrorist

If democratic reform efforts in Muslim majority nations progress over the next five years,
political participation probably would drive a wedge between intransigent extremists and

groups willing to use the political process to achieve their local objectives. Nonetheless,
attendant reforms and potentially destabilizing transitions will create new opportunities
for jihadists to exploit.

Al-Qa'ida, now merged with Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi's network, is exploiting the
situation in Iraq to attract new recruits and donors and to maintain its leadership role.

   ·   The loss of key leaders, particularly Usama Bin Ladin, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and
       al-Zarqawi, in rapid succession, probably would cause the group to fracture into
       smaller groups. Although like-minded individuals would endeavor to carry on the
       mission, the loss of these key leaders would exacerbate strains and disagreements.
       We assess that the resulting splinter groups would, at least for a time, pose a less
       serious threat to US interests than does al-Qa'ida.

   ·   Should al-Zarqawi continue to evade capture and scale back attacks against
       Muslims, we assess he could broaden his popular appeal and present a global

   ·   The increased role of Iraqis in managing the operations of al-Qa'ida in Iraq might
       lead veteran foreign jihadists to focus their efforts on external operations.

Other affiliated Sunni extremist organizations, such as Jemaah Islamiya, Ansar al-
Sunnah, and several North African groups, unless countered, are likely to expand their
reach and become more capable of multiple and/or mass-casualty attacks outside their
traditional areas of operation.

   ·   We assess that such groups pose less of a danger to the Homeland than does al-
       Qa'ida but will pose varying degrees of threat to our allies and to US interests
       abroad. The focus of their attacks is likely to ebb and flow between local regime
       targets and regional or global ones.

We judge that most jihadist groups--both well-known and newly formed--will use
improvised explosive devices and suicide attacks focused primarily on soft targets to
implement their asymmetric warfare strategy, and that they will attempt to conduct
sustained terrorist attacks in urban environments. Fighters with experience in Iraq are a
potential source of leadership for jihadists pursuing these tactics.

   ·   CBRN capabilities will continue to be sought by jihadist groups.

While Iran, and to a lesser extent Syria, remain the most active state sponsors of
terrorism, many other states will be unable to prevent territory or resources from being
exploited by terrorists.

Anti-US and anti-globalization sentiment is on the rise and fueling other radical
ideologies. This could prompt some leftist, nationalist, or separatist groups to adopt
terrorist methods to attack US interests. The radicalization process is occurring more

quickly, more widely, and more anonymously in the Internet age, raising the likelihood of
surprise attacks by unknown groups whose members and supporters may be difficult to

   ·   We judge that groups of all stripes will increasingly use the Internet to
       communicate, propagandize, recruit, train, and obtain logistical and financial

Comments: Post a Comment

<< Home


March 2006   April 2006   May 2006   June 2006   July 2006   August 2006   September 2006   October 2006   November 2006   December 2006   January 2007   February 2007   March 2007   April 2007   May 2007   June 2007   July 2007   August 2007   September 2007   November 2007   December 2007   January 2008   February 2008   March 2008   April 2008   May 2008   June 2008   July 2008   August 2008   September 2008   March 2009   April 2009  

This page is powered by Blogger. Isn't yours?