No Easy Answers
Thursday, January 04, 2007
Fitzgerald Reply in Opposition to Libby's Proposed Jury Instructions [Doc 230]
Case 1:05-cr-00394-RBW Document 230 Filed 01/04/2007 Page 1 of 17
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )
) CR. NO 05-394 (RBW)
v. )
)
I. LEWIS LIBBY, )
also known as "Scooter Libby" )
GOVERNMENT'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF
GOVERNMENT'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS,
AND IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED ALTERNATIVES
The UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, by PATRICK J. FITZGERALD, SPECIAL
COUNSEL, respectfully submits the following response to defendant's proposed jury instructions.
BACKGROUND
On November 13, 2006, both parties submitted proposed jury instructions to the Court. On
December 22, 2006, each party submitted objections to the other's proposed instructions. The
parties also proposed miscellaneous instructions in connection with proceedings pursuant to the
Classified Information Procedures Act and various motions in limine.
Instructions to Which the Parties Agree
Based on the parties' submissions to date, it appears that the parties agree to the Court's
giving the following instructions from the Bar Association of the District of Columbia's Criminal
Jury Instructions (4th ed. Revised 2005)(The Red Book)("D.C. Form Instructions"):
1.02 1.16 2.04 2.08 2.27 2.73
1.05 2.01 2.05 2.09 2.42 2.75
1.10 2.02 2.06 2.11 2.52 2.76
1.11 2.03 2.07 2.13 2.71
Case 1:05-cr-00394-RBW Document 230 Filed 01/04/2007 Page 2 of 17
In addition, the government has proposed that the following D.C. Form Instructions be given,
and the defense has neither specifically objected to the government's proposal, nor proposed
alternative instructions:
1.07 (Questions Not Evidence) 2.43 (Cross-examination of Character Witnesses)
2.10 (Direct / Circumstantial Evidence) 2.48 (Statements of the Defendant - Substantive
Evidence)
2.14 (Nature of Charges Not Considered) 2.70 (Redacted Documents)
2.23 (Testimony of Immunized Witness) 3.02 (Proof of State of Mind)
2.28 (Defendant as Witness) 3.07 ("On or about" Proof of)
2.29 (False/Inconsistent Statement
by Defendant)
We therefore assume that the defense agrees with the giving of these instructions.
The defense also has neither objected to, nor offered alternatives for, the following additional
instructions proposed by the government, most of which were drawn from O'Malley-Grenig-Lee,
Federal Jury Practice and Instructions ("O'Malley"): (a) instructions setting forth the statutory
language of each of the statutes under which defendant is charged (18 U.S.C. §§ 1503, 1001(a)(2),
and 1623(a) and the nature of the charges); (b) a separate unanimity instruction to be given with
respect to Counts 2, 3, 4 and 5 (§1001(a)(2) false statements and § 1623(a) perjury) in addition to
the general unanimity instruction; and (c) a limiting instruction with respect to evidence admitted
solely for the purpose of establishing its effect on defendant's state of mind. We assume that the
defendant agrees to the giving of these instructions as well.
Finally, the government has agreed to the Court's giving the defendant's additional proposed
instructions numbered 3, 5, 6, 9, 10 and 16.
2
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Instructions That Are In Dispute
The government objects to the following instructions proposed by the defense:
1 (Pretrial Instructions) The government agrees in part and objects in
part, and has proposed modifications,
particularly with respect to the summaries of
the elements of the charged offenses. ^1
2 (Pretrial Publicity) The government objects to a single sentence
as set forth in its Response to Defendant's
Proposed Jury Instructions ("Gov. Dec. 22
Response"), and would agree to the giving of
this instruction if that sentence were omitted.
4 (Credibility of Law Enforcement The government objects to this proposed
Witnesses) instruction, and has proposed the use of D.C.
Form Instruction No. 2.26 instead.
7 (Propriety of Defendant's Disclosures of The government objects to this proposed
the NIE) instruction and has proposed an alternative as
set forth in the Gov. Dec. 22 Response.
1
The government has objected to the defendant's proposed description of the nature of the
case as incomplete. The case should be described as follows:
According to the indictment, the government began an investigation in September
2003 into possible unauthorized disclosures to various reporters of classified
information regarding the CIA employment of Valerie Wilson, the wife of
Ambassador Joseph Wilson, in the spring of 2003. The indictment charges that,
during the course of this investigation, defendant I. Lewis Libby knowingly and
willfully made materially false statements during two interviews with FBI agents in
the fall of 2003, and that Mr. Libby knowingly and willfully provided materially false
testimony under oath during two appearances before a federal grand jury in March
2004. The indictment further alleges that, by deliberately providing false testimony
to the grand jury, Mr. Libby corruptly endeavored to obstruct the due administration
of justice.
The defendant denies that he is guilty of any of the offenses charged in the
indictment.
3
Case 1:05-cr-00394-RBW Document 230 Filed 01/04/2007 Page 4 of 17
8 ("Findings from the Science of The government objects to this proposed
Memory") instruction and, as discussed in the Gov. Dec.
22 Response, asserts that D.C. Form
Instruction No. 2.11 (to which the defense has
agreed) properly address the issues the jury
should consider in assessing whether
inaccuracies in defendants statements to
investigators and the grand jury were
attributable to faulty memory.
11 (Obstruction of Justice) The government objects to this proposed
instruction. The government originally
proposed the use of O'Malley §§ 48.01-48.05.
The government would agree to the use of
Defense No. 11 if the substantial
modifications outlined in the Gov. Dec. 22
Response were made.
12 (False Statements) The government objects to this proposed
instruction. The government originally
proposed the use of O'Malley §§ 40.05-40.8
and 40.13-40.14. The government would
agree to the use of Defense No. 12 if the
substantial modifications outlined in the Gov.
Dec. 22 Response were made.
13 (Ambiguity) The government objects to this proposed
instruction on the ground that there is no
factual basis for giving it.
14 (Perjury) The government objects. The government
originally proposed an instruction based on
O'Malley §§ 50.06- 50.08 and case authority.
The government would agree to the use of
Defense No.14 if the substantial
modifications outlined in the Gov. Dec. 22
Response were made.
15 (Unanimity) The government requests that D.C. Form
Instruction 2.72 be given instead.
4
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The defense has objected to the following instructions proposed by the government:
Obstruction of Justice - Elements and The defense has objected to the government's
Definition of Terms proposed instructions and proposed an
alternative (Defense No. 11) to which the
government objects. As indicated above, the
government would agree to Defense No. 11 if
the modifications outlined in the Gov. Dec.
22 Response were made.
False Statements - Elements and Definition of The defense has objected to the government's
Terms proposed instruction and proposed an
alternative (Defense No. 12) to which the
government objects. As indicated above, the
government would agree to Defense No. 12 if
the substantial modifications outlined in the
Gov. Dec. 22 Response were made.
Perjury - Elements and Definition of Terms The defense has objected to the government's
proposed instruction and proposed an
alternative (Defense No. 14) to which the
government objects. As indicated above, the
government would agree to Defense No. 14 if
the substantial modifications outlined in the
Gov. Dec. 22 Response were made.
Unanimity The defense has proposed an alternative
(Defense No. 15) to which the government
objects.
Instruction on Employment Status of Valerie The defense proposed an alternative to which Plame. the government objects.
Instruction on Testimony Regarding The defense proposed an alternative to which Classified Information the government objects. ^2
2
The government proposed this instruction during the CIPA proceedings. The defendant
submitted an alternative instruction in a supplemental filing on December 15, 2006. The government
included its proposed instruction in the Gov. Dec. 22 Response, but inadvertently omitted to state
its strong objection to the defendant's alternative..
5
Case 1:05-cr-00394-RBW Document 230 Filed 01/04/2007 Page 6 of 17
Instruction on the Absence of Charges The provided an alternative to which the Related to Defendant's Disclosure of government objects. Information Regarding Valerie Plame Wilson
ARGUMENT
In his response to the government's proposed jury instructions, defendant argued that: (a)
the government's proposed instruction regarding the elements of 18 U.S.C. §1503, obstruction of
justice (Count 1) is deficient in that it understates the requisite mens rea and overstates the conduct
for which the jury could properly convict the defendant; (b) the government's proposed definition
of materiality with respect to the false statement charges (Counts 2 and 3) is inadequate; (c) the
wording of the government's proposed definition of materiality for purposes of the perjury charges
(Counts 4 and 5) is deficient; and (d) the government's proposed instructions related to false
statements and perjury improperly fail to instruct the jury with respect to the effect of ambiguous
questioning. As demonstrated below, the objections raised in defendant's response to the
government's proposed jury instructions lack merit. ^3
I. The Government's Proposed Instructions Accurately State the Law Regarding the
Requisite Mens Rea for Obstruction of Justice.
In order to establish a violation of § 1503, the government must establish that the defendant
acted with the wrongful intent or improper purpose to influence the judicial or grand jury proceeding,
whether or not the defendant is successful in doing so. E.g., United States v. Quatrrone, 441 F.3d
153, 170 (2d Cir. 2006)(citing United States v. Fassnacht, 332 F.3d 440, 447 (7th Cir.2003); United
3
Defendant argues generally that the government's instructions fail to address certain critical
issues, and requests that the Court give the instructions he has proposed. The government sets forth
its position with respect to the defendant's proposed instructions and limits its argument to the
specific objections raised by the defendant in its Response to the Government's Proposed Jury
Instructions.
6
Case 1:05-cr-00394-RBW Document 230 Filed 01/04/2007 Page 7 of 17
States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 599 (1995)). The government's proposed instructions, which were
drawn directly from O'Malley-Grenig-Lee, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions (§§ 48.04 and
48.05) accurately state the law:
To act "corruptly" as that word is used in these instructions means to act voluntarily
and deliberately and for the purpose of improperly influencing, or obstructing, or
interfering with the administration of justice.
* * *
The term "endeavors" as used in these instructions means to knowingly and
deliberately act or to knowingly and deliberately make any effort which has a
reasonable tendency to bring about the desired result.
It is not necessary for the government to prove that the "endeavor" was successful or,
in fact, achieved the desired result.
Contrary to defendant's contention, the foregoing do not understate the requisite mens rea of a
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503. Instead, they inform the jury that, in order to convict, the jury must
find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted knowingly, voluntarily and deliberately, for
the purpose of improperly influencing, or obstructing, or interfering with the administration of
justice. Thus, these instructions make clear that the defendant may not be convicted unless the jury
finds that he acted knowingly, voluntarily and deliberately, with the specific intent of improperly
influencing, obstructing or interfering with the administration of justice, and do not allow for a
conviction based on "innocuous" efforts to influence the grand jury's investigation, because they
require that the defendant deliberately attempted to improperly influence, obstruct or interfere with
it. The government's proposed instruction fully and accurately apprises the jury that the defendant
may not be convicted unless he acted deliberately and with consciousness of wrongdoing.
7
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Defendant's demand that the term "for the purpose of improperly influencing, or obstructing,
or interfering with the administration of justice" be replaced with the term "with specific intent to
subvert or undermine the administration of justice" is also unwarranted. At best, defendant's
proposed terminology is more unfamiliar and confusing. How often does the average juror see or
use the term "subvert"? At worst, it is misleading. The New Oxford American Dictionary (2001
edition) (at 1697) defines the term "to subvert" as to "undermine the power and authority of (an
established system or institution). Section 1503 includes no requirement that the defendant
specifically intend to undermine the power and authority of the grand jury, but only to improperly
influence, obstruct or impede the grand jury's investigation.
Nor would inserting the terms "dishonestly" or "with consciousness of wrongdoing" as
defendant suggests add any meaning to the government's proposed description of the requisite mens
rea. To the contrary, it would lead to confusion with redundancy. Count 1 charges that the
defendant corruptly endeavored to influence, obstruct or impede proceedings before Grand Jury 03-3
in the federal district court of the District of Columbia by knowingly making certain following
materially false and misleading statements and representations under oath. The government's
proposed instruction requires that the jury find that the defendant acted voluntarily and deliberately,
for the purpose of improperly influencing, obstructing or impeding the investigation. How might
a person knowingly lie to a grand jury under oath, voluntarily and deliberately for the purpose of
improperly influencing, obstructing or impeding its investigation, without acting dishonestly or with
consciousness of wrongdoing? By adding such terms, the instruction would only confuse the jury
by suggesting that knowingly making materially false declarations under oath, voluntarily and
deliberately "for the purpose of improperly influencing, obstructing or impeding" a federal grand jury
8
Case 1:05-cr-00394-RBW Document 230 Filed 01/04/2007 Page 9 of 17
investigation, is somehow not in itself "dishonest" and "consciously wrongful," and leading the jury
to speculate regarding what additional evidence might be required to find that the defendant
acted"dishonestly" and with consciousness of wrongdoing.
Finally, defendant cites, and research reveals, no authority for the proposition that a defendant
charged with obstruction of justice under § 1503 is entitled to an instruction that requires the jury
to find not only must the defendant have deliberately lied for the purpose of improperly influencing,
obstructing, or interfering with the grand jury's investigation, but also that his conduct was
"wrongful, immoral, depraved or evil." As the D.C. Circuit has noted, "[w]ords like `depraved,'
`evil,' `immoral,' `wicked,' and `improper' are no more specific-indeed they may be less specific-
than `corrupt'" and defining vague terms with other vague terms serves no purpose. United States
v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369, 379 (D.C. Cir. 1991)(citing Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990)).
Moreover, there is no legal requirement that the government meet this additional burden and, thus,
including this language in the instruction would misstate the law. In fact, considering that the terms
"immoral," depraved," and "evil," are commonly associated with conduct of a completely different
character, that is, conduct that is violent and/or sexually deviant, it is difficult to imagine that a jury
would ever apply these terms to a violation of § 1503.
Defendant's reliance on United States v. Arthur Andersen, 544 U.S. 696 (2005) is misplaced.
As defendant concedes, the instruction rejected by the Supreme Court in that case made it sufficient
for the defendant to have acted for the purpose merely of "impeding" a government function. Def.
Rsp. at 3. In order to argue that the government's proposed instruction suffers from the same
deficiency, the defendant is forced to omit the term "improperly" from the government's instruction.
Def. Rsp. at 3 ("The government's definition defines "corruptly" as "acting" to "influenc[e], or
9
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obstruct[] or interfer[e].") Moreover, as previously noted, the Court in Arthur Andersen specifically
distinguished the language of § 1512(b)(2)(A) and (B) from that of § 1503, however, observing that,
whereas the relevant provision of § 1512 requires that a defendant have acted both"knowingly" and
"corruptly," § 1503 (and § 1505) require that a defendant merely have acted "corruptly." 544 U.S.
at 706, n. 9. Here, the alleged conduct is inherently "dishonest" and improper. Knowingly making
materially false declarations to a grand jury cannot be innocuous. The additional requirement that
the defendant have done so for the purpose of "improperly" influencing, obstructing or impeding the
grand jury's investigation clearly conveys the point that the defendant must have acted with an
improper purpose. See also United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 882 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Nothing
more is required.
For all of these reasons, the government strongly objects to the Defense Proposed Instruction
No. 10 unless it is modified to remove the terms "dishonestly," "wrongful, immoral, depraved and
evil," and "specific intent to subvert." Consistent with the above, the government would agree to
the following modified elements instruction:
Count One charges Mr. Libby with corruptly endeavoring to influence, obstruct or
impede the due administration of justice obstruction of justice. In order to sustain
this charge, the government must prove each of the following essential elements
beyond a reasonable doubt:
1. That there was a proceeding pending before a federal grand jury;
2. That Mr. Libby knew of the pending grand jury proceeding;
3. That Mr. Libby endeavored to influence, obstruct, or impede
the due administration of justice in that proceeding as charged
in Count One; and
10
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4. That Mr. Libby acted corruptly, that is, voluntarily and
deliberately and for the purpose of improperly influencing, or
obstructing, or interfering with the administration of justice.
It is not necessary for the government to prove that Mr. Libby was successful in
improperly influencing, obstructing or interfering with the grand the "endeavor" was
successful or, in fact, achieved the desired result.
II. The Government's Proposed Instruction Regarding the Elements of Obstruction of
Justice, as Modified, More Closely Tracks the Language of the Indictment, as
Defendant Advocates.
Defendant argues that the government's proposed instruction fails to set out the means by
which the indictment charges that the defendant endeavored to obstruct justice. In the Gov. Dec. 22
Response, the government proposed a modification to Defense No. 10 that would resolve the
defendant's objection:
Count One charges that, in March 2004, Mr. Libby corruptly endeavored to
influence, obstruct or impede proceedings before Grand Jury 03-3 in the federal
district court of the District of Columbia by knowingly making the following
materially false and misleading statements and representations under oath: [Continue
with paragraphs numbered 1 through 3 as set forth on page 23 of the defendant's
proposed instructions, and omit the language that follows.]
The government agrees that the means by which the indictment charges the defendant
committed the offense charged in Count 1 should be included in the jury's charge. In addition, based
on the discussion in Section I above, the government suggests that language related to the requisite
mens rea be added, and that the language of the indictment related to the charged false declarations
be tracked more closely, as the defendant advocates. Thus, the government proposes the following
modification:
Count One charges that Mr. Libby corruptly endeavored to influence, obstruct and
impede the due administration of justice by knowingly making the following
materially false and misleading statements and representations under oath, voluntarily
11
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and deliberately, for the purpose of improperly influencing, obstructing or interfering
with the proceedings before Grand Jury 03-3 in the District of Columbia:
When Mr. Libby spoke with Tim Russert of NBC News, on or about July 10,
1.
2003,
a. Mr. Russert asked Mr. Libby if Mr. Libby knew that Joseph Wilson's wife
worked for the CIA;
b. Mr. Russert told Mr. Libby that all the reporters knew it;
c. At the time of this conversation, Mr. Libby was surprised to hear that
Wilson's wife worked for the CIA;
Mr. Libby advised Matthew Cooper of Time magazine on or about July 12, 2003, that
2.
he had heard that other reporters were saying that Wilson's wife worked for the CIA,
and further advised him that Mr. Libby did not know whether this assertion was true;
Mr. Libby advised Judith Miller of the New York Times on or about July 12, 2003
3.
that he had heard that other reporters were saying that Wilson's wife worked for the
CIA but Mr. Libby did not know whether that assertion was true.
III. The Government's Proposed Instructions Accurately Define the Term "Material" for
Purposes of Counts 2 and 3.
The defendant charges that the government's proposed definition of the term "material" is
deficient in that it would allow the jury to "nit-pik Mr. Libby's statements and convict him based on
a finding that he lied about unimportant facts." To remedy this purported problem, the defendant
proposes the additional following language:
The test is whether the false statement has the capacity to impair or pervert the
functioning of the FBI. In other words, a statement is material if it relates to an
important fact as distinguished from some unimportant or trivial detail.
This objection is meritless. The government's proposed definition ("A statement is material if it has
a natural tendency to influence, or is capable of influencing" a governmental function) has been
approved by the Supreme Court, United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995)(quoting Kungys
12
Case 1:05-cr-00394-RBW Document 230 Filed 01/04/2007 Page 13 of 17
v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 770 (1988)). The instruction does not allow a conviction based upon
lies that are "unimportant;" to the contrary, it allows conviction only upon a showing that the charged
lie was material. As the Supreme Court has stated, the questions the jury must answer are simple
and straightforward: (a) "[W]hat statement was made?" (b) "[W]hat decision was the agency trying
to make?" and (c) "[W]hether the statement was material to the decision?" 515 U.S. at 512. Thus,
it is necessary to show only that the statement was important in the sense that it was capable of
influencing a decision of the FBI.
It would be improper to instruct the jury that it must determine whether the fact or facts to
which the statement relates are "important" or "trivial," in a general sense in that it would invite the
jury to assess the materiality of the charged statements by reference to their own views of what is
important or unimportant or by their views of what the defendant considered, or should have
considered, important and unimportant. Defendant's modification of the essential elements of 18
U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2) fits neatly with his anticipated arguments that information regarding Ms. Wilson
and his conversations regarding this information were "unimportant" and therefore he forgot them.
The jury must not be permitted to confuse the alleged "unimportance" of information regarding Ms.
Wilson's employment to Mr. Libby with the question of whether the defendant's statements were
important to the conduct of the FBI's investigation and, thus, could have influenced that
investigation.
IV. The Government's Proposed Instructions Accurately Define the Term "Material" for
Purposes of Counts 4 and 5.
Defendant charges that the government's proposed elements instruction for Counts 4 and 5
(perjury) creates the risk that the defendant could be convicted based on innocent, immaterial
13
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statements only tangentially related to material issues"based on its syntax, that is, its use of phrase,
"The false testimony concerned matters that were material to the grand jury investigation." The
government disagrees with this assessment and notes that, in light of the instruction's requirement
that the false testimony be "knowingly given," and the definition of "materiality" proposed along
with the elements instruction, there is no risk that the defendant would be convicted based on
innocent, immaterial statements if the government's proposed instruction were given.
In any event, in the Gov. Dec. 22 Response, the government agreed to a modified version of
defendant's formulation of the elements of perjury which would resolve any objection based on the
use of the word "concerned":
Counts Four and Five charge Mr. Libby with perjury. In order to sustain a charge of
perjury, the government must prove each of the following essential elements beyond
a reasonable doubt:
1. That Mr. Libby made a statement before the grand jury while he was under oath;
2. That such statement was false in one or more of the respects charged;
3. That Mr. Libby knew such statement was false when he made it; and
4. That the false statement was material to the grand jury's inquiry, that is, that it had
the effect of influencing the decision or actions of the grand jury, or was capable of
or had the potential to do so.
It is not necessary for the government to prove that a decision or action of the grand
jury actually influenced the false statement, but only that it was capable, or had the
potential of doing so.
V. Defendant Is Not Entitled to an Instruction that "Educates Jurors How to Weigh
Ambiguities Under Bronston."
The defendant objects to the government's proposed instructions in that they "fail to inform
the jurors how their deliberations should be affected by ambiguity in the questions asked of Mr.
14
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Libby and the answer he gave." Def. Reply at 6. However, defendant fails to identify a single
question or answer that he claims is in any way ambiguous and, thus, there is no ambiguity for the
jury to "weigh" in this case. Thus, there is no reason, and no proper basis, for instructing the jury
regarding ambiguity, and defendant should not be able to inject an issue into the jury's deliberations
that does not exist. See, e.g., Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 63 (1988)(stating that
defendant is "entitled to an instruction as to any recognized defense for which there exists evidence
sufficient for a reasonable jury to find in his favor").
The Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Bronston, 409 U.S. 352 (1973) has no
application to this case. There, the Supreme Court ruled that the defendant could not be convicted
of perjury based on an "answer that [was] literally true but unresponsive, even assuming the witness
intends to mislead his questioner by the answer." In Bronston, the defendant was charged with
perjury based on his testimony in a bankruptcy proceeding when asked whether he had any accounts
in Swiss banks, and he answered, "The company had an account there for about six months, in
Zurich." While the defendant's testimony that the company had an account in Zurich for about six
months was literally true, the answer was intentionally misleading in that it failed to account for the
fact that he, too, held a personal Swiss bank account. Because defendant has not, and cannot,
identify any charged false declaration made in response to an ambiguous question, or any charged
false declaration that was "literally true" but misleading, there is no basis under Bronston or any
other authority to instruct the jury in this case on how to weigh ambiguity as part of their
deliberations.
15
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CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, the United States respectfully requests that this Court sustain
the government's objections to defendant's proposed jury instructions, and overrule the defendant's
objections to the instructions proposed by the government.
Respectfully submitted,
_________/s/___________
PATRICK J. FITZGERALD
Special Counsel
Office of the United States Attorney
Northern District of Illinois
219 South Dearborn Street
Chicago, Illinois 60604
(312) 353-5300
Dated: January 3, 2006.
16
Case 1:05-cr-00394-RBW Document 230 Filed 01/04/2007 Page 17 of 17
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that on this 3rd day of January, 2006, I caused true and
correct copies of the foregoing to be served on the following parties by electronic mail:
William Jeffress, Esq.
Baker Botts
The Warner
1299 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20004-2400
Facsimile: 202-585-1087
Theodore V. Wells, Esq.
Paul Weiss
1285 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10019-6064
Facsimile: 212-373-2217
John D. Cline, Esq.
Jones Day
555 California Street
San Francisco, CA 94104
Facsimile: 415-875-5700
Patrick J. Fitzgerald
Special Counsel
U.S. Department of Justice
1400 New York Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20530
202-514-1187
By: /s/
Debra Riggs Bonamici
Deputy Special Counsel
17
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